Mark N. Katz, a professor of government and politics at George Mason University, has written extensively on Soviet and Russian foreign policy toward the Middle East for over a quarter century. His recent works on this subject include: "Russian-Iranian Relations in the Ahmadinejad Era," Middle East Journal, Spring 2008; "Implications of the Georgian Crisis for Israel, Iran, and the West," Middle East Review of International Affairs, December 2008; and "Saudi-Russian Relations since the Abdullah-Putin Summit," Middle East Policy, Spring 2009. He is also a regular contributor to Eurasianet and Middle East Strategy at Harvard.

During his visit to Moscow earlier this month, US President Barack Obama was said to have been primarily concerned with winning Russian cooperation vis-à-vis Iran. Many in Washington believe that Russia holds the keys to peacefully defusing the threat posed by Iran's nuclear program, and that it is willing to use them for the right price.[1]

Although the Russian-Iranian relationship is riddled with mistrust and conflicts of interest, this does not give Moscow a compelling interest to facilitate an American-Iranian rapprochement or pressure Tehran to stand down. What limited cooperation Russia is prepared to offer in this regard will likely be ineffectual, prohibitively expensive, or both.

Background

The Obama administration's initial hopes for improving relations with both Russia and Iran may have been party based on the knowledge that Russian-Iranian relations have been difficult, both in the past and at present. Indeed, while Moscow and Tehran both see the United States as their principal antagonist, they are not allies. When Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei called on Moscow to join his country in a "strategic alliance against common enemies" in January 2007 (and sent his personal representative to Moscow the following month to outline the proposal in more detail), Putin "replied evasively," according to the Russian daily Kommersant, and the idea was soon dropped.[2]

Equally revealing is Iran's stalled bid to join the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), a multilateral group comprised of Russia, China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan. Iran has openly lobbied for membership, apparently in the hope that its entry would imply some degree of Russian (and Chinese) commitment to Iranian security vis-à-vis the West. Though Moscow occasionally hints that it supports membership for Iran in principle, in practice it is not pushing for this.[3]

The failure of Russia and Iran to subordinate their differences to the common pursuit of challenging the United States is partly due to their history of bad blood. In the 19th century, Russia battled Iran (then known as Persia to the West) over control of Central Asia and the Caucasus. In the 20th century, the Soviet Union (along with Britain) took control of the country to secure its oil fields and prevent it from cooperating with Germany during World War II. Just after the war, Moscow attempted to promote separatism in Iran's northwest. In the 1980s, Moscow backed Saddam Hussein's Iraq in its bloody eight-year war with Tehran. Relations improved after the fall of the Soviet Union, but mistrust on both sides has persisted.

Notwithstanding their shared antipathy to Washington, Russia's geopolitical ambitions do not readily overlap with Iran's aspirations as a regional power. Moscow's top priority is combating American influence not in the Middle East, but in the former Soviet republics that comprise Russia's "near abroad." In fact, Moscow is broadly supportive of Washington's efforts to combat Al-Qaeda and has cultivated friendly relations with the two foremost US allies in the region, Israel and Saudi Arabia - Iran's chief rivals. Moscow may compete with the US in the Arab world for arms, petroleum, and other contracts, but it is not out to overturn American hegemony in the Middle East. Even if it were, fully aligning itself with Iran's Shiite Islamic Republic would only serve to alienate the predominantly Sunni Arab world.

Russian-Iranian cooperation has been driven less by parallel aspirations or a common worldview than by reciprocal accommodation on certain issues. In the 1990s, Russia began providing Iran with arms and assistance building its nuclear program, while shielding it from the threat of multilateral sanctions. In return, Tehran largely acquiesced to heavy-handed Russian domination of the six predominantly Muslim republics of the former Soviet Union in the Caucasus and Central Asia, in spite of its strong religious ties to the region (Azerbaijan, like Iran, is majority Shiite; the rest are majority Sunni), as well as significant ethnic and linguistic links (ethnic Azeris constitute a quarter of Iran's population, Tajikistan's official language is a dialect of Farsi).[4] Furthermore, Tehran expressed relatively little criticism of Russia's war against the predominantly Muslim breakaway republic of Chechnya and played an important role in watering down Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) resolutions critical of its conduct. Chechen leader Zelimkhan Yandarbiyev publicly derided Tehran as an "agent of Russia" that "betrayed the interests of the Muslim World," as did mainstream Arab media outlets.[5]

In addition to reciprocal accommodation, Russia and Iran both derive a second important benefit from their relationship - leverage with other governments (particularly Western ones). Following Russia's August 2008 invasion of Georgia, for example, Prime Minister Vladimir Putin repeatedly hinted that Washington's reaction to the crisis would affect Moscow's willingness to cooperate vis-à-vis Iran. In a similar fashion, Iranian officials have sought to "instrumentalize" their relationship with Moscow in diplomacy with European governments.

Both considerations make the Russian-Iranian relationship very complex and very contentious, especially with regard to three critical issues.

Nuclear Proliferation

Russian policy concerning Iran's alleged pursuit of a nuclear weapons capability appears contradictory at first glance. On the one hand, Moscow has publicly stated its opposition to the acquisition of nuclear weapons by Iran and even voted in favor of limited sanctions by the UN Security Council. On the other hand, it has been an active participant in building Iran's nuclear infrastructure. Officially, Moscow has always accepted at face value (all evidence to the contrary notwithstanding) Iran's claim to be pursuing a purely peaceful, civilian energy program allowed under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, though Russian officials often acknowledge doubts in private.

Though few in Moscow would welcome a nuclear-armed Iran, the prospect is seen as one of many potential security threats facing Russia, and not the most dangerous. The White House wants Iran's alleged pursuit of nuclear weapons stopped at virtually any price; the Kremlin would merely prefer this outcome, but not at any price. It pays lip service to the idea of preventing Iran from going nuclear because it wants to be seen as a responsible great power, but its main concern is to play the Western standoff with Iran to Moscow's advantage.

Iran's nuclear program is also profitable for Russia, which has struggled to slow the decline of its once formidable scientific and industrial base. But the $800 million price tag of the Russian-built Bushehr nuclear reactor now nearing completion is not the decisive factor for Moscow. More important than economic profit is the leverage Russia gets from positioning itself as a key intermediary between Iran and the West.

Moscow's proposals to resolve the standoff by having Russia enrich uranium for Iran's reactor are designed to institutionalize this role - rendering the West dependent on Russia to ensure that Iran forgoes enrichment and leaving Iran dependent on Russia to operate its reactors. Moreover, Russia's proposal would greatly enhance its prestige as a great power capable of brokering solutions to major international problems. "Russia's success in Iran - especially if it manages to convince Tehran on the need for full cooperation in the nuclear realm - could become a turning point in terms of recognition of Russia as an independent center of power in today's world," the Russian daily Nezavisimaya gazeta proclaimed optimistically in October 2007.[6]

Though Putin managed to win American acceptance of the proposal, the Iranians have flatly refused to halt domestic uranium enrichment even if they agree to obtain some enriched uranium from other countries.[7] Many in the West see this as proof positive that Tehran is seeking to acquire nuclear weapons. In fact, there is another reason for this recalcitrance: Iran does not trust Russia to keep its end of the bargain. Moscow's repeated delays in completing the Bushehr reactor as well as its on-again off-again attitude toward selling S-300's to Tehran (to be discussed later) make this understandable.

A breakthrough on completing the Bushehr project appeared to be made in January 2008, when Moscow finally delivered the enriched uranium needed for start up of the reactor and Russian officials suggested that it would be up and running by the end of the year.[8] By the fall of 2008, however, Russian government and nuclear power industry sources were saying that the Bushehr plant would not begin operating until some unspecified time in 2009, citing a variety of technical problems (e.g. integrating Russian equipment with equipment from other countries).[9] Such tactics further inflamed Iranian distrust of Russia. "They have promised several times (to complete the reactor) but they did not carry it out for some reason. Maybe they have their own reasons," Iran's energy minister complained in November 2008.[10]

The Iranians are also suspicious of Russia's refusal to block any and all Security Council action against them (after all, support for any sanctions is inconsistent with official Russian statements as to the peaceful nature of their nuclear program). Russian officials have tried to mollify the Iranians by claiming that they softened UNSC sanctions, but to little avail. "Russia and China advertise support for Iran until the last minute [only] to take the greatest possible concessions from America and Europe and ultimately make deals with the two powers," complained Mohsen Armin, spokesman for the Organization of the Mojahedin of the Islamic Revolution after both voted in favor of an IAEA decision to refer Iran to the Security Council in February 2006.[11]

Ironically, many in Moscow have the exact same suspicion of Iran. Rogue states "force Moscow to do thankless work (for example, to shield them at the United Nations and protect them from sanctions)," wrote one Russian analyst in the wake of the US-Libyan rapprochement, "but later, when the time is right, they surrender to some American official on favorable terms.[12]

Arms

The limitations of Russia's strategic partnership with Iran are also evident in the sphere of arms sales. Although the volume of Iranian purchases pales in comparison to those of Russia's top two customers (China and India), it has grown substantially. Russian arms sales to Iran ballooned from $300 million between 1998 and 2001 to $1.7 billion between 2002 and 2005.[13] The last major Russian arms delivery, 29 short-range Tor-M1 air defense systems, came in early 2007.

However, Russia has stopped short of providing Iran with weapons that could prove decisive in the event of an American or Israeli air strike on its nuclear facilities.[14] Iran desperately wants to purchase the S-300, a long-range surface-to-air missile system that experts say is comparable to the US-built Patriot system in sophistication. Both the US and Israel have strongly urged Russia not to provide these weapons to Iran.

Although Russia secretly concluded a contract to sell Iran the S-300 around two years ago (a fact that was only recently confirmed by a top Russian defense official),[15] it has delayed delivery ever since. In much the same way that Russian work on Bushehr slowed when Iran rejected Russia's nuclear enrichment proposal, Moscow has kept the status of the S-300 sale up in the air, maximizing its leverage over Washington and Israel (which are kept worrying about how to stop the sale) and Iran (which is kept worrying about how to complete it). "Moscow sees the S-300 contract and cooperation with Iran as a whole as a tool in the political bargaining with the West and not as a way to meet Russia's fundamental defense and commercial interests," observed Ruslan Pukhov, the director of the Moscow-based Centre for Analysis of Strategies and Technologies (CAST).[16]

Iranian officials have periodically announced the delivery of the S-300s as imminent, only to be rebuffed by Russian denials.[17] In December 2008, the deputy head of the Iranian parliament's National Security and Foreign Policy Committee sent shockwaves through the world by declaring that, ''after a few years of talks with Russia, now the S-300 system is being delivered."[18] However, Russia's Federal Military-Technical Cooperation Service (the government agency overseeing arms sales) quickly denied that there were any deliveries underway.[19] According to some reports, Moscow has specifically reassured the Israelis about this in order not to jeopardize the Russian military's efforts to purchase Israeli unmanned aerial vehicles.[20]

There are clearly some in Moscow who are loathe to deny Iran the S-300 for fear that it will allow China to make inroads in Iran and send the wrong message to other would be arms purchasers about Russian reliability as a supplier.[21] How the interplay of domestic forces will impact this question is complicated (one expert summed it up as "the confluence of the narrow and short-sighted material motives of power groups and the widespread set of interests among numerous other actors, shored up with an ideology of rising geopolitical assertiveness"),[22] but there seems to be a consensus view that Russia's credibility as a great power depends on not being seen as caving into pressure when its clients are in need.

Oil and Gas

Energy has moved to the forefront of relations between Russia and Iran, both of which have enormous reserves of oil and natural gas. This gives them both convergent interests as producers (especially a preference for higher prices) and divergent interests as competitors. The latter is particularly true of gas, which is delivered most cost effectively by pipeline and typically sold through long-term contracts (e.g. 25 years) to cover the upfront costs of pipeline construction. This creates a unique form of energy dependency: the supplier can shut down the flow of gas at a whim--which can have an immediate negative impact on buyers since they cannot readily switch suppliers. Of course, a gas supplier that does this will also experience an immediate drop in revenue. In addition, since suppliers cannot just pick up and move their pipelines, they cannot sell to other buyers as easily as the producers of oil can. Buyers and sellers of natural gas, then, are highly co-dependent.

Russia supplies 42% of the gas imported by the EU--nearly all of it through the state-controlled gas monopoly, Gazprom. Moreover, Gazprom is the sole gas supplier to eight countries in central and Eastern Europe, and the majority supplier to six others.[23] Moscow hopes to derive enormous leverage from this dependency, which it hopes will expand.

In order to reduce this dependency, the United States and many European governments have sought alternative gas supplies from the Caspian through pipeline routes bypassing Russia. By necessity, such routes must go through Armenia, Georgia or Iran. With continued Azeri-Armenian hostility over Nagorno-Karabakh preventing the construction of pipelines through Armenia and the Western standoff with Tehran ruling out transshipment through Iran, Georgia became the focal point of EU diversification efforts. The Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum (BTE) gas pipeline, which is now transporting gas from offshore Azerbaijan through Georgia to Turkey (from which it can be piped to elsewhere in Europe), was a first step in this effort. The Nabucco pipeline now under consideration is intended to increase the volume of gas that can be distributed from Turkey to the rest of Europe.

However, Europe's gas diversification plans face two overwhelming obstacles. First, the ease with which Russian forces pushed deep into Georgia last August demonstrated how readily Moscow can disrupt pipelines that go through this country. In fact, some are concerned that routing more gas through Georgia will only give Russia more incentive to dominate the country. This leaves Iran as the only route for a pipeline that Russia cannot easily cut off.

The second problem is finding enough gas supplies to be sent through these pipelines. The Caspian states sell most of their gas to Gazprom via Soviet era pipelines and are wary of upsetting Moscow by committing to Nabucco. Some are already committed to long-term contracts with Gazprom. With the second largest gas reserves in the world, here too Iran is the natural solution to the supply problem.

For Moscow, it is therefore critical that Iran not cooperate with the EU's efforts to break its dependency on Russia for gas. Ironically, Washington has helped Russia do this by discouraging the foreign investment Iran needs to boost its gas production and build pipelines to export it. Under American pressure, the European firms Total, Shell, and Repsol have recently withdrawn from contracts to develop Iran's South Pars gas field (the world's largest).

Naturally, American objections have not stopped Russia's Gazprom from seeking investment opportunities in Iran. However, Iran seems to be exhibiting a decided preference for Gazprom's Chinese competitors. In January 2009, China National Petroleum Corp. (CNPC) signed a $2 billion contract to develop Iran 's North Azadegan oil field.[24] In March, Tehran announced that it had signed a $3.2 billion agreement with a Chinese consortium to develop the South Pars gas field.[25]

Iran has also angered Moscow by frequently reiterating its willingness to supply Europe with gas. Tehran has proposed building a pipeline running from Iran through Turkey into Europe.[26] In February 2009, the head of the National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC) declared that Iran and Total were finalizing a $5 billion contract to develop the South Pars gas field. In fact, the talks were moving "very slowly," according to senior Total official, and ended up going nowhere.[27]

In addition, Moscow and Tehran have proposed two very different ideas for strengthening the collective clout of the Gas Exporting Countries Forum (GECF), which had hitherto been little more than a periodic discussion forum. Whereas Tehran wants GECF to be a cartel of gas producing countries similar to the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), Russia wants it to be a looser grouping for the coordination of gas prices and transportation routes,[28] but which would have no decision-making power over Russian gas production or export levels.[29] Rather than joining a multilateral cartel in which its preferences can be overruled, Moscow aspires to become (in effect) a cartel unto itself by exerting control over other gas producers. Iran is unlikely to accede to this ambition.

The Obama Factor

While there are considerable strains in the Russian-Iranian relationship, expectations that Moscow will be willing to fundamentally change its posture toward Tehran are probably misplaced. Russia has little to gain from facilitating a peaceful resolution of Iran's conflict with the West.

Such a resolution would eventually lead to a reduction or end to American economic sanctions against Tehran, which would not be to the benefit of Russian enterprises in Iran. If its international stature were restored sufficiently to give it the choice, Iran may well prefer to buy weapons and nuclear reactors built by reputable Western firms that have no history (like their Russian counterparts) of delaying contractual obligations due to political considerations. At a minimum, Russian firms would have to offer better terms than they have in order to gain or even retain business in Iran.

An American-Iranian détente could result in the US acquiescing to Iran serving as an alternative gas supplier to Europe, which would be an enormous blow to Russian interests. Although the Obama administration has maintained Washington's stance against European gas deals with Iran, its public statements appear less adamant and hint that this could change. Referring to proposals that Iran be contracted to supply the Nabucco pipeline, US envoy Matthew Bryza said in March, "The Obama administration does not take a positive approach toward participation of Iran in this project at present."[30]

Finally, were Iran to totally (and verifiably) abandon its objectionable enrichment activity and tone down its support for extremist groups in Lebanon and Gaza, it would no longer depend on Russian favor in the Security Council. Since Moscow still requires continued Iranian favor in Central Asia and the Caucasus, it does not want to help create a situation where Tehran has no reciprocal needs.

The Obama Administration, though, cannot expect even limited cooperation from the Russians unless it is willing to make major concessions on other issues of concern to Moscow. President Obama has already pledged to support Moscow's entry into the World Trade Organization, and he has hinted that Washington may be willing to shelve plans to build a missile defense system in Eastern Europe in return for Moscow's cooperation in defusing the Iranian nuclear threat. Another possible US concession sought by Moscow is the exclusion of Georgia and Ukraine from NATO.

While Russian President Dmitry Medvedev may hold out the prospect of collaboration to see what concessions the Obama administration is willing to make, he is unlikely to offer the kind of decisive action vis-à-vis Iran that many in Washington are hoping for. Moscow does not want Iran to embark on a course of action that will diminish Russia's value as a protector and partner of the Islamic Republic. Even a nuclear-armed Iran would be preferable to this prospect.

Notes

  [1] "The only chance to dissuade Iran is if the U.S. and Russia are linked together on Iran," said Brent Scowcroft, a former two-time national US national security advisor who has advised the Obama administration. "Scowcroft Likes Prospects for Better Ties to Russia, China," The Wall Street Journal, 1 May 2009.
  [2] Mikhail Zygar, "Iran Counsels Russia on Security Matters," Kommersant, 9 February 2007, in Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press (hereinafter referred to as Current Digest), 7 March 2007.
  [3] While welcoming Iran's role as an observer member of the SCO (alongside India, Pakistan, and Mongolia), Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Alexei Borodavkin said in February 2009, "the SCO has maintained a moratorium on the admission of new members and it is likely to persist for some time." Russian Official Downplays Tehran's Chances for Shanghai Cooperation Organization Membership, Eurasia.net, 20 February 2009.
  [4] As early as 1992, Russian officials openly justified their support for Iran as necessary to prevent its sponsorship of Islamic political movements in the Caucasus. "Russia Sees Rich Reward in Iranian Links," The Guardian (London), 31 May 1995.
  [5] William A. Samii, "Iran and Chechnya: Realpolitik at Work," Middle East Policy, March 2001.
  [6] "Iranian Nexus," Nezavisimaya gazeta, 19 October 2007, in Current Digest, 14 November 2007.
  [7] "Russia Ships First Lot of Nuclear Fuel to Iran; Kremlin," The Washington Post, 18 December 2007.
  [8] "Russia Makes Third Fuel Supply for Iran Nuclear Power Plant," ITAR-TASS, 18 January 2008 (World News Connection).
  [9] "Iran Expects Russia to Complete Bushehr Power Plant on Schedule," IRNA, 18 October 2008 (World News Connection); "Russia Pledges to Complete Bushehr N. Plant in 2009," Fars News Agency, 28 November 2008 (World News Connection); and Artur Blinov, "Bushehr NPP to Begin Operation in 2009," Nezavisimaya gazeta, 28 November 2008 (World News Connection).
  [10] "Iranian Minister Calls on Russia to Complete Bushehr Power Plant," Vision of the Islamic Republic of Iran Network 1, November 1, 2008 (World News Connection).
  [11] Sharq (Tehran), 1 February 2006. Translated excerpt in Bill Samii, "Iran Spins Nuclear Crisis but 'Elites' Have Questions," RFE/RL, 11 February 2006.
  [12] Gennady Sysoyev, "What's at Stake," Kommersant, 2 February 2005, in Current Digest, 9 March 2005.
  [13] Backgrounder: Russia-Iran Arms Trade, Council on Foreign Relations, 1 November 2006.
  [14] According to some reports, Israeli forces have developed serious plans for such an attack. Too Late to Dissuade Iran? (especially the post by Louis René Beres and Isaac Ben-Israel), Middle East Strategy at Harvard, 22 April 2008; Assign Iran to Israel? Middle East Strategy at Harvard, 26 June 2008, ; and Robert O. Freedman, Growing U.S.-Israel Gap on Iran, Middle East Strategy at Harvard, 5 September 2008.
  [15] "Reports: Russia Confirms Iran Missile Contract," The Associated Press, 18 March 2009.
  [16] RIA Novosti (Moscow), 18 March 2009 (BBC Worldwide Monitoring).
  [17] Just such a scenario unfolded in December 2007 when the Iranian defense minister claimed that Moscow was selling S-300s to Tehran and Moscow subsequently denied doing so. "Defense Minister Najjar: Russia to Deliver S-300 SAM System to Iran," Voice of the Islamic Republic of Iran Radio 1, 26 December 2007 (World News Connection); Luke Harding, "Russia Sells Iran New Anti-Aircraft Missiles," The Guardian, 27 December 2007, p. 26; Borzou Daragahi and James Gerstenzang, "Iran Reports Air Defense Purchase," The Los Angeles Times, 27 December 2007; and "Russia Not Considering S-300 Missile System Supplies to Iran-Federal Service," RIA Novosti, 28 December 2007 (World News Connection).
  [18] "Tehran Says It's Getting Missiles," The New York Times, 22 December 2008.
  [19] "Federal Service Denies Alleged Supply of S-300 Systems to Iran," Interfax, 22 December 2008.
  [20] "Reports on the possible sale to Tehran of the S-300 have been appearing with a frequency of one to several times a year for ten years now. High-level Iranian officials figure as the source more often than not." Gennadiy Nechayev, "Missile Neurosis: Israel Could Supply Russia with Unmanned Aerial Vehicles-But Only If It Is Persuaded That Iran Would Not Come in For Russia's S-300 Systems," Vzglyad, 27 December 2008 (World News Connection).
  [21] The pro-Kremlin daily Izvestiya reported that the Chinese have produced "an exact copy of the S-300" and are now offering it for export at a cheaper price. Izvestiya (Moscow), 18 March 2009.
  [22] Alla Kassianova, "Russian Weapons Sales to Iran: Why They Are Unlikely to Stop," PONARS Policy Memo, No. 427, December 2006.
  [23] Gazprom is the sole supplier for Bosnia-Herzegovina, Estonia, Finland, Macedonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova and Slovakia. It is the majority supplier to Bulgaria (97 percent), Hungary (89 percent), Poland (86 percent), the Czech Republic (75 percent), Turkey (67 percent), and Austria (65 percent) John C.K. Daly, "Analysis: Putin to Head Gazprom?," United Press International, 5 February 2008.
  [24] Paul Sampson, "Flash Points: China in Iran," Energy Compass, 23 January 2009.
  [25] "Iran, China Sign Gas Deal," The Los Angeles Times, 15 March 2009.
  [26] Ladane Nasseri and Lucian Kim, Iran Seeks to Build $4 Billion Gas Pipeline to Europe, Bloomberg.com, 25 September 2008, .
  [27] "Analysis: Iran May Enter LNG Market with French Assistance," UPI Energy, 27 February 2009.
  [28] Sergei Kulikov and Igor Naumov, "Moscow Delays Creation of a Gas OPEC," Nezavisimaya gazeta, 29 April 2008, p. 6, in Current Digest, 17-18, 20-27 May 2008.
  [29] See, for example, statements made by Putin in "From the Transcript of President Vladimir Putin's Press Conference on Feb. 1, 2007," Izvestia, 2 February 2007, pp. 3-4, in Current Digest, 28 February 2007; Pyotr Iskenderov and Aleksandr Grivach, "Cartel-Based Spirituality," Vremya novostei, 30 January 2007, in Current Digest, 28 February 2007; and Mikhail Sergeyev, "Gas OPEC Goes Underground," Nezavisimaya gazeta, 1 February 2007, p. 4, in Current Digest, 28 February 2007.
  [30] "U.S. Opposes Iran's Gas for Nabucco," UPI Energy, 13 March 2009.