An American raid against an alleged terrorist hideout in Syria two months ago continues to mystify informed observers of US-Syrian relations.

On October 26, helicopter-borne US commandos stormed a building in the Albou Kamal border region of eastern Syria, killing eight people according to local media reports. While Bush administration officials refused to publicly confirm or deny responsibility for the attack, they quickly fanned out to the media to explain what happened anonymously (and not altogether consistently). The deceased target of the attack was revealed to be Badran Turki al-Mazdih (aka Abu Ghadiyah). Abu Ghadiyah, an Iraqi Sunni, was one of four major Al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) "facilitators" designated by the Treasury Department as living in Syria and playing a major role in smuggling fighters, weapons, and cash into Iraq.[1]

Although Syrian officials insisted that the eight people killed in this "terrorist aggression" were all civilians, including a woman and three children, it appears likely that Abu Ghadiyeh was among the dead (otherwise he would have had every reason to release a video showing himself alive).

The operation was carried out under a classified 2004 executive order (dubbed "Al-Qaeda Network Exord") that streamlined authorization for the US military to attack Al-Qaeda targets outside of officially declared war zones. Nearly a dozen uninvited military operations on foreign soil were authorized in this way over the past four years,[2] including at least a few smaller-scale air incursions into Syria aimed at disrupting terrorist infiltration into Iraq.

While the 2004 executive order was intended (and, in most cases, employed) as a means of hitting targets of opportunity on short notice, the avowed goal of the raid on Syria appeared to be communicative. One senior official told The Washington Post that the attack was intended to send a warning to Syrian President Bashar Assad to "clean up the global threat that is in [his] back yard."[3] By contrast, a US raid into Pakistan less than two months earlier was clearly not intended to punish or deter the Pakistani government (small consolation to those who find being ignored even worse).

Why such a warning should come when it did is unclear, as US military officials in Iraq had been saying for some time that infiltration from Syria was on the decline. Indeed, just a few weeks before the October raid, then-commander of US forces in Iraq, Gen. David Petraeus, said that the number of foreign fighters entering Iraq each month had declined "from over 100" in 2007 to "less than probably 20."[4] Although US commanders have typically credited this decline to their own efforts on the Iraqi side of the border, late last year Petraeus explicitly acknowledged that Syria "has taken steps to reduce the flow of the foreign fighters through its borders with Iraq."[5]

It's possible that new evidence was very recently obtained showing terrorist infiltration into Iraq to be greater than previously assumed. However, public statements about the issue by US officials in the months prior to the raid were not suggestive of any major reassessment, though Damascus came under a torrent of American criticism after the raid for "supporting and giving a safe haven to terrorist network."[6]

Neoconservative hawks within the Bush administration have long maintained that Assad has never done everything he could reasonably do to disrupt the jihadist networks, and that some in the Syrian regime (with or without his knowledge) are directly complicit in their activities. This was undoubtedly true at one time, and is probably true to an extent even now - most officials in the Syrian government are corruptible for the right price (the late Lebanese Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri once bought a vice-president). However, there is a fine line between support for terrorist infiltration into Iraq and lack of diligence in stopping it (and an even finer line between deliberate and unintentional lack of diligence).

While informed observers of Syria are heavily divided as to where the regime falls on this continuum, the Bush White House was sufficiently satisfied with Syrian border control as to pursue a substantial diplomatic opening to Damascus over the last year. In late September, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice (and Assistant Secretary of State David Welch) met with Syrian Foreign Minister Walid Moallem and Syrian Ambassador to Washington Imad Moustapha, after which she praised Syria's indirect peace talks with Israel and its establishment of formal diplomatic relations with Lebanon. "She sat with us and said the United States wants to engage with Syria, wants to re-evaluate its relationship," Moustapha later told Newsweek, "and suddenly this raid happens out of the blue."[7]

The rest of the world was also surprised and perturbed by the Bush administration's abrupt decision to deliver a "warning" to Syria by military means. The raid was publicly condemned or criticized by France, Britain, the European Union, Russia, China, and several key Arab states,[8] all of whom are in the midst of reestablishing close ties with Damascus. Exiled Syrian dissidents who are normally loathe to side with Assad on anything felt obliged to condemn the attack. The London-based head of the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood, Ali Sadr al-Din al-Bayanouni, called it a "flagrant aggression" against Syria and criticized Assad's tepid response.[9] Even pro-American Iraqi leaders were unsettled, with some complaining that the raid will make it more difficult for them to assert Iraqi sovereignty in the face of interference from Iran.[10]

While the decision-making process that took place in the 48 hours preceding the attack remains shrouded in mystery, few informed observers believe that the impetus came from US field commanders in Iraq. They were in the midst of delicate negotiations with Iraqi leaders over a Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) governing the future deployment of US forces in the country, trying to fend off demands for a clause prohibiting US attacks on other states from Iraqi territory.[11] A few days before the raid, the top marine commander in Iraq, Maj. Gen. John Kelly was asked about infiltration from Syria in a press conference and did not appear particularly concerned about it. "We still have a certain level of foreign fighter movement, not much . . . that is increasingly a more secure border."[12] Some analysts have suggested that US commanders in Iraq may have been kept out of the chain of decision-making.[13]

All of these considerations underscore that the avowed goal of the raid - delivering a "warning" - was probably not the actual goal. No one in a lame duck administration would imagine that they could credibly threaten a foreign government with punitive action when the incoming administration (and the rest of the world) is openly committed to diplomatic engagement. For similar reasons, the notion that the attack was an "October surprise" intended to affect the following week's presidential election is questionable - it's difficult to imagine anyone in a position of authority judging such a scheme to be viable.

Some anonymous administration sources have said that the raid was launched at least partly because of opportunity considerations, at the direction of the CIA, when an intelligence breakthrough revealed Abu Ghadiyah's whereabouts. However, even if the intelligence on Abu Ghadiyah's whereabouts presented a once-in-a-lifetime opportunity to strike, the decision to undertake such an unprecedented violation of Syrian sovereignty is a policy call that only the White House can make. At any rate, there's little independent evidence to suggest that Abu Ghadiyah was unusually hard to locate (by terrorist standards). In May, he brazenly entered Iraq himself and commanded an attack on a police station that left 11 Iraqi officers dead. One US official anonymously told the Associated Press that the administration had received intelligence indicating that Abu Ghadiyah was preparing to lead a second raid into Iraq,[14] but this only underscores that he was not taking smart precautions to evade the long arm of the American global security apparatus.

It's conceivable that the raid was driven less by the emergence of new intellgence than by the desire to obtain new intelligence on Syrian complicity, which might throw a wrench in a prospective diplomatic opening to Damascus by the Obama administration. It is clearer now that the original intent of the mission was probably to capture Abu Ghadiyah, who is believed to have died in the fighting. According to one terrified eyewitness quoted by the Associated Press, two men (possibly dying or deceased) were whisked away by the departing commandos.[15] Nearly two weeks after the raid, CNN quoted "a Saudi source with access to detailed intelligence" as saying that the operation had indeed been intended to capture Abu Ghadiyah.[16]

Finally, there have been some reports that Syria privately gave permission for the strike - that its public protestations were inspired by the unexpected collatoral damage and public commotion it caused.[17] This would explain why it came not at the low point of US-Syrian relations (when terrorist infiltration was high), but at a point when relations have improved sufficiently for such security coordination. It also came amid an upsurge in Islamist violence against the regime that may be linked to Assad's less hospitable treatment of the jihadists. If Assad actually wanted to eliminate Abu Ghadiyah, letting the US do the dirty work may have been the most politically astute option.

In all likelihood, the Bush administration's military intervention in Syria was not driven by any one overarching factor. In the face of a rare (but probably not unique) opportunity to take out Abu Ghadiyah, residual hostility to Syria (and irritation over losing out in Lebanon) within the administration may have intersected with an ideological desire to further consecrate the Bush doctrine of preemptive defense and a degree of Syrian ambivalence.

Notes

  [1] US Department of the Treasury, Treasury Designates Members of Abu Ghadiyah's Network Facilitates flow of terrorists, weapons, and money from Syria to al Qaida in Iraq, 28 February 2008.
  [2] The 2004 executive order identifies 15 to 20 countries, including Syria, Pakistan, and numerous Arab states, where al-Qaeda militants were believed to operate, according to senior US officials. Target countries require varying degrees of high-level government approval (e.g. cabinet level for Somalia, presidential for Pakistan and Syria). See "Secret Order Lets U.S. Raid Al Qaeda," The New York Times, 10 November 2008.
  [3] " U.S. Calls Raid a Warning to Syria," The Washington Post, 28 October 2008.
  [4] Gen. David Petraeus, Getting the Big Ideas Right: The Strategic Concepts that Helped Achieve Substantial Progress in Iraq, Heritage Foundation lecture, 8 October 2008.
  [5] Petraeus Has Rare Praise for Syria, Not Sure About Iran, Voice of America, 6 December 2007.
  [6] US Embassy in Damascus Charge d'Affaires Maura Connelly, speaking at a November 24 security conference of Iraq's neighbors held in Damascus. "Syria rejects US claims it is aiding terrorists," The Associated Press, 24 November 2008.
  [7] "Cooperation Hits a Snag," Newsweek, 10 November 2008.
  [8] "France calls for restraint after US attack on Syrian village," Agence France Presse, 27 October 2008; "Europe criticizes U.S. air raid in Syria," United Press International, 29 October 2008.
  [9] Assad's response suggests he is "is not concerned about defending citizens and the country," said Bayanouni, though he was quick to emphasize that he is not advocating war with America. Al-Arabiya TV (Dubai), 30 October 2008, translation by BBC Monitoring.
  [10] The raid "will give the Iranians reason to increase their interference here," complained Kurdish politician Mahmoud Othman. "Iraq politicians warn raid could hurt US pact," The Associated Press, 27 October 2008.
  [11] Ali Gharib, "Analysts Question Timing, Motive of Syria Raid," Interpress Service, 29 October 2008.
  [12] Defense Department Briefing, Live via telecast, 23 October 2008.
  [13] "I have a sneaking suspicion that the authority to do this came right out of the White House," Col. Pat Lang, a retired U.S. military intelligence officer, told Interpress Service. Ibid.
  [14] "Al-Qaida route though Syria persists," The Associated Press, 28 October 2008.
  [15] "US official: Raid on Syria killed leader of cell," The Associated Press, 27 October 2008.
  [16] Source: U.S. meant to capture militant killed in Syria, CNN.com, 6 November 2008.
  [17] Marie Colvin and Uzi Mahnaimi, "Questions raised over Syrian complicity in US raid," The Sunday Times, 2 November 2008; Richard Sale, Killing of al-Qaida Smuggler in Syria was Joint Syrian, U.S. Effort, Middle East Times, 21 November 2008.