The new administration of President-elect Barack Obama will probably bring a substantial retooling of American policy toward Lebanon, though the precise contours are not yet clear.

The Bush administration's zealous encouragement of the March 14 coalition's drive to monopolize executive power already ran its course months ago. After spurning political compromises with the largely Shiite and Christian opposition for eighteen months at the urging of Washington, this past spring the Sunni and Druze-dominated coalition was forced to accept a far more sweeping triplet of concessions that will probably spell the end of its political dominance (a national unity government, a compromise candidate for president, and the abrogation of an undemocratic occupation-era electoral law). American intervention in the political process brought none of the expected strategic benefits (e.g. weakening Syrian and Iranian regional clout), produced unanticipated costs (e.g. the proliferation of Sunni jihadist groups), and eventually became irrelevant as European and Arab governments brokered dialogue. In light of the immense promise and opportunity presented by the withdrawal of Syrian forces from Lebanon in 2005, the Bush administration's failure to effectively project American influence in Lebanon can only be regarded as a perfect storm of lost opportunities.

At the height of sectarian militia violence that preceded the Doha Accord in May, Obama voiced a sharp critique of the Bush administration's policy in Lebanon, one that is gaining currency among informed (particularly European) observers of Lebanon but is almost never expressed by sitting officials. While condemning the Iranian-backed Lebanese Shiite Hezbollah movement, he called for "diplomatic efforts to help build a new Lebanese consensus that focuses on electoral reform, an end to the current corrupt patronage system, and the development of the economy that provides for a fair distribution of services, opportunities and employment."[1]

His statement was met with a firestorm of criticism in the US, as it largely summarized the domestic political demands of the Lebanese opposition. Although public statements by American presidential candidates aren't usually a reliable indicator of their intentions once in office, Obama's striking deviation from the conventional wisdom in Washington at the height of his primary battle against Hillary Clinton clearly was not driven by political expediency. Rather, it reflected his diagnosis, gleaned from an expanding "brain trust" of foreign policy advisors, of why developments in Lebanon haven't unfolded as the administration anticipated.

Contrary to the avalanche of criticism touched off by his statement, Obama was advocating political and economic reform in Lebanon not as a means of mollifying Hezbollah, but as a means of defeating Hezbollah. Creating "a mechanism whereby the disaffected have an effective outlet for their grievances" that "assures them they are getting social services,'' he explained in a subsequent interview with New York Times columnist David Brooks, will encourage Lebanon's impoverished Shiite underclass ''to peel support away" from Hezbollah militants and ''view them as an oppressive force.''[2] While Obama had previously raised the issue of Lebanon's "disaffected" Shiites in congressional subcommittee hearings,[3] this was the first time he explicitly said that addressing Lebanon's internal inequities was critical to facilitating Hezbollah's disarmament.

While Obama's policy toward Lebanon will be significantly shaped by his pursuit of diplomatic engagement with Syria and Iran, there is little reason to doubt his commitment to Lebanon's sovereignty (other than his consultations with some Bush I administration officials). On the contrary, he appears to recognize that reforms in Lebanon and a government that can credibly speak for all Lebanese are necessary to bolster its sovereignty vis-a-vis Syria and Iran. The Bush administration's big mistake wasn't trying to use Lebanon as an instrument of leverage over Syria, it was misunderstanding how to achieve this.

It helps that Obama lacks his predecessor's warm affection for the Saudi royal family, which has its own designs in Lebanon and incentives to mislead Washington. Over the past few years, Obama has repeatedly denounced the religious intolerance of Saudi leaders (e.g. when a Saudi court sentenced a Shiite gang rape victim to public lashings in November 2007 for violating gender segregation laws),[4] while singling out the kingdom in calling for US energy independence. "Obama's claims about Saudi Arabia . . . are unacceptable," the leading Saudi daily Al-Watan retorted shortly before the election.[5] Obama's emphasis that Al-Qaeda (or Al-Qaedism) is the number one threat to American security (not Iran) is a surefire sign that he is outside Prince Bandar's "circle of trust," and that has enormous implications for US policy in Lebanon, where the Sunni community is heavily patronized by the Saudis.

In sharp contrast to his predecessors, Obama is "quite well informed about Lebanon" (according to Brooks),[6] a virtue that should bring an end to the spectacular litany of US blunders in dealing with the country. Washington's encouragement of Israel's June-July 2006 war against Hezbollah (and exhortations to expand the war to Syria) are today widely derided even by the Israelis themselves. Other miscalculations include publicly accusing Maronite Christian Patriarch Nasrallah Boutros Sfeir of sectarian incitement two weeks before the 2005 parliamentary elections[7] (which saw American-backed Christian candidates trounced by Michel Aoun's Free Patriotic Movement) and hosting right wing Christian ex-warlord Samir Geagea in Washington DC this past spring (oblivious, it seems, to the fact that close relatives of politicians he was convicted of having assassinated during the civil war are prominent in both of the competing political camps today).[8]

Obama may pursue largely the same overarching goals in Lebanon as his predecessors (i.e. degrading the threat posed by Hezbollah, weakening Syrian influence), but he will not be easily duped into taking actions that defy logic. Nor will he be easily dissuaded from actions that logic clearly dictates (at least not by the counsel of self-interested supplicants). For example, the president-elect has said he will do more than the Bush administration to arm the Lebanese military,[9] an institution that Lebanese of all sectarian groups trust (much to the chagrin of factional leaders). The political landscape of Lebanon is today very different from that encountered by the Bush administration and many decisions will not be so clear cut, but the Obama administration appears well equipped to navigate through the morass.

With the noticeable exception of Geagea,[10] most Lebanese political leaders openly welcomed Obama's victory.[11] This may come from practice in reading the writing on foreign walls, but it also appears to reflect an expectation that, if nothing else, Obama will not lead them into the abyss by mistake.

Notes

  [1] "Statement of Senator Barack Obama on Situation in Lebanon," States News Service (via Lexis Nexis), 9 May 2008.
  [2] David Brooks, "Obama Admires Bush," The New York Times, 16 May 2008.
  [3] Hearing of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 13 September 2006.
  [4] "U.S. Offers Mild Criticism in Saudi Rape Case," Reuters, 19 November 2007.
  [5] Al-Watan, 20 October 2008.
  [6] David Brooks, "Obama Admires Bush," The New York Times, 16 May 2008.
  [7] "Sfeir brushes off U.S. accusations he is stirring sectarian strife," The Daily Star (Beirut), 13 May 2005; Cardinal Sfeir Accused by U.S. of Stirring Sectarian Strife, YaLibnan.com, 13 May 2005,
  [8] Gaga Over Geagea, Harpers, 14 March 2008.
  [9] David Brooks, "Obama Admires Bush," The New York Times, 16 May 2008.
  [10] "The March 8 Forces' candidate won the US election," he told reporters when asked his opinion on the election results, referring to the Hezbollah-led Shiite bloc of the opposition. "Most local politicians congratulate Obama on historic election," The Daily Star (Beirut), 6 November 2008.
  [11] Druze leader Walid Jumblatt hailed Obama's victory as giving hope to the "oppressed of the world." "Junblatt hails Obama's election as victory for world's oppressed," The Daily Star, 7 November 2008.