David Stanford is a British journalist and editor based in Cairo, and a regular contributor to The Daily News Egypt.

The Egyptian government has been preparing a bold new initiative to regulate satellite television and the Internet that critics say is aimed at cracking down on dissenting voices in the region's two fastest growing media sectors. However, considering the increasingly united opposition to censorship from Egyptian civil society, the government's concern with its international image, and the steep economic costs of attempting to stifle the communications revolution, many experts believe that the effort will fail. The first battle in this contest will decide the fate of a controversial draft law on audio-visual media - initially pencilled in for the current parliamentary session, but not yet formally submitted by the government.

Egypt and the New Media

Although the scope of what journalists are allowed to say has expanded in recent years, the Egyptian government has no shortage of legal (if not legitimate) instruments to censor and intimidate the media. The state of emergency in place since 1981 gives the government wide-ranging discretionary powers to restrict freedom of expression in the name of national security. Even the regular penal codes can be used to jail citizens for such infractions as "insulting the president."

However, the Internet and satellite television pose special problems for the government because it does not control the broadcast sites. According to Gamal Eid, executive director of the Arab Network for Human Right Information (ANHRI), these two media "have played a big role in the escalating movement asking for democracy."[1]

The Internet

The Internet poses two main threats to the Egyptian government. First, it circumvents the government's grip on conventional media. The most celebrated example is that of blogger Wael Abbas, who posted video clips of torture by Egyptian police officers (which resulted in the conviction of three for sodomising a suspect in custody). The case highlights the power of cyberspace to expose the most unsavory goings on in Egypt's police and security apparatus.

The Internet is also emerging as an important instrument of collective action, which is especially difficult in Egypt because the right to free assembly is heavily restricted. On April 6, 2008, Egyptian activists using Facebook brought thousands of people into the streets to support a textile workers strike, resulting in riots and clashes with security forces. At least fifteen members of the so-called Facebook Youth were arrested.[2] Although a subsequent attempt to mobilize a mass demonstration through Facebook fell flat, the potential of networking sites to facilitate opposition activity is promising.

After the riots subsided, the state-run media launched diatribes about the evils of cyberspace. In an editorial entitled "the dark realm of the Internet in Egypt," the official daily Al-Ahram warned that the web "poses a threat to the security, stability and ethics of society" and called for action to be taken "against the violations committed by Internet users before it becomes necessary to involve security agencies to restore order."[3] Such warnings alluded to the prospect that Egypt would join the swelling ranks of Arab governments that filter (or try to filter) web content accessible by their citizens (Lebanon, Morocco, Jordan are the only other holdouts).

The following month, an Egyptian government-owned Internet service provider started blocking the website of the opposition movement Kefaya, in what appeared to have been an isolated test (or warning).[4] More ominously, the authorities began requiring customers at Internet cafes to provide verifiable personal identification before going online.[5] The government also began forcing mobile phone companies to block service to anonymous users (both to prevent anonymous Internet access by phone and to enable a telephone pass-code authorization system for Internet cafes).[6]

Because of the country's high illiteracy rate, the most expansive media sector is television. Whereas only 8% of Egyptians use the Internet,[7] most Egyptian families own a television and have some degree of access to satellite broadcasting. During the era of terrestrial broadcasting, Arab governments had a monopoly on television. It was possible for the Saudi government to go two days without reporting the 1990 Iraqi invasion of Kuwait (and for the Syrian government to go considerably longer without acknowledging its destruction of Hama in 1982).

Today, satellite television stations fall into three categories in descending order of independence from Egyptian government control. The first, Egyptian (or Egypt-based) stations, can be shut down arbitrarily by revoking their broadcasting licenses, and their officials are subject to arrest under various statutes that restrict free speech. It rarely comes to that. Dream TV, Egypt's first privately-owned television station, has fired a succession of popular presenters (e.g. Hala Sirhan, Ibrahim Eissa, Muhammad Hassanayn Haykal, and Hamdi Kandil) after they incurred government disapproval.[8] In February 2008, the authorities reportedly forced Al-Mehwar TV to cancel a scheduled discussion of Egypt's anti-terrorism law with just a few hours notice.[9]

The second category, foreign (or foreign-based) media outlets that broadcast via the Egyptian government's Nilesat satellite network, can be blocked from transmitting, but are less vulnerable to criminal prosecution. Stations kicked off of Nilesat recently without prior notice include the Iraqi pro-insurgent Al-Zawra channel in February 2007 (due in part to pressure from Washington), the Islamic-oriented Al-Baraka and Al-Hikma stations in February 2008, and the London-based Al-Hiwar (known for its political talk shows hosting outspoken Egyptian dissidents) in April.[10]

Finally, there are foreign stations that broadcast through satellite operators other than Nilesat, such as Al-Jazeera (which quickly hired Heikal after he was forced off of Dream TV). While many operate with little or no staff in Egypt, those that do are subject to government pressures. In May 2005, Egyptian police briefly detained eight Al-Jazeera employees who attempted to establish a live telecast at a meeting of the Judges Club (an NGO that presses for judicial independence and reform).[11] In July 2008, the Cairo office of the Iranian channel Al-Alam was raided by police and shut down. The following month, the authorities ordered the US government-funded Al-Hura satellite station to cancel the videotaping of two programs on democracy activists in Egypt.

Foreign stations can also be pressured by harassing local companies that provide them with satellite transmission services and equipment. After Al-Jazeera broadcast footage of the April 2008 Mahalla Al-Kobra protests (including footage of protesters pulling down and defacing a large poster of Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak), the government closed down the operations of the Cairo News Company (CNC) on the grounds that it had supplied Al-Jazeera with equipment used to film the protests. The head of CNC, Nader Gohar, was faced with up to three years in prison for "constituting an unauthorized communications network" before receiving a fine in late October.[12]

On the whole, however, the governments of Egypt and other Arab states can do little to influence a large segment of the broadcasts that reach their people. A watershed event was the 2006 war between Israel and Hezbollah. During the early days of the war, Saudi Arabia and a few other pro-American Arab governments publicly blamed the Lebanese Shiite for provoking the destruction unleashed on Lebanon by Israel. However, Hezbollah's adroit use of Al-Manar satellite television broadcasts to galvanize Lebanese and Arab public support during the war forced them to halt the accusations and even praise its "resistance" to Israel. The spectacle of "Arab governments changing their foreign policy in response to public opinion driven by the media" was a first for the region.[13]

In addition to transmitting information that governments may wish to suppress, satellite broadcasting in the Arab world is reshaping popular perceptions of the public sphere. Political talk shows (especially on Al-Jazeera) allow ordinary citizens to call in and express themselves freely. Even seemingly apolitical programming can encourage democratic norms. The fact that millions of Arabs have cast votes for their favorite contestants on "Superstar" (the Arab equivalent of "American Idol") cannot sit very well with the region's unelected political superstars.

Reining in the New Media

The Mubarak regime's efforts to defuse the threat posed by satellite and Internet broadcasting have been led by Information Minister Anas al-Fiqi, a close ally of Gamal Mubarak, a son of the current president who aspires to take over the reins of power when his aging father eventually steps down. According to Eid, Fiqi has purged members of the 'old guard' from the ministry and replaced them with a 'new guard' purporting to adopt a more sophisticated and modern approach to managing the media. The recent spate of station closures came amid statements by Gamal Mubarak criticizing "one-sided stations trying to harm Egypt."[14]

Egyptian officials recognized that inter-government cooperation in the Arab world would be required to defuse the threat posed by satellite television. Al-Jazeera can operate on the ground in most of the Arab world without displaying much regard for the political sensitivities of ruling autocrats because the latter haven't because these regimes haven't coordinated their actions against it.

The Arab League Broadcasting Charter

At the initiative of Egypt (with strong Saudi backing), Arab League ministers of information met in February 2008 and approved a non-binding charter on satellite broadcasting, entitled "Principles for Organizing Satellite Radio and Television Broadcasting in the Arab Region."

Signed by all but two delegates (Lebanon and Qatar), the 13-article charter bans broadcasting that has a "negative influence on social peace and national unity and public order and decency," harms "the supreme interests of Arab states," or defames Arab "leaders or national and religious symbols." As is often the case with such legislation, social conservatives are placated with provisions banning the encouragement of sexual activity and alcohol consumption. The elasticity of this terminology gives Arab governments wide latitude in cracking down on troublesome satellite television stations without fear of condemnation or obstruction from co-signatories.

Although the charter is non-binding on governments, it recommends that the signatories render it binding on broadcasters under their jurisdiction, append its provisions automatically to all existing broadcasting agreements (including those of stations in so-called "free media zones"), and punish violators with confiscation of assets and withdrawal of licenses.[15]

At a press conference following the summit, Fiqi declared that it the charter is intended "to protect the Arab citizen's right to healthy media that respect their traditions and customs," singling out religious channels that broadcast "fatwas and deception" ("ignorant and illegitimate religious edicts," as he put it a few days later.[16] ). Asked if the charter was binding, he stated that "the mere fact that it has been endorsed by the council of Arab information ministers means that it is binding" and vowed that Egypt would be the first to implement it. "Since we are the ones who called for this extraordinary meeting, we should be the first to apply it," he said.[17]

Although pro-government commentators and press organs throughout the Arab world echoed Fiqi's praise for the charter,[18] it was widely criticized by intellectuals of all political persuasions. Egyptian opposition parties denounced the charter in their respective press outlets in a flurry of editorials, with titles like "Anas al-Fiqi's sins" (Al-Ahrar) and "The media of his excellency" (Al-Dustour).[19] The charter also drew condemnations from leading international human rights groups.[20]

Nevertheless, Arab information ministers met again in June and decided (without any apparent appreciation of the glaring Orwellian overtones) to establish a committee to draft a "guide of media terminology for Arab causes" to replace "false and defamed terms" frequently in use among satellite television and Internet news outlets.[21]

The New Media Law

After the release of the Arab League broadcasting charter, Fiqi began working on legislation to enact it into law and establish a supreme censorship authority in Egypt with jurisdiction over both audio-visual broadcasting and the Internet. In July, the independent paper Al-Masry Al-Youm published a draft copy of the legislation that had been circulating within the government.[22] Although some contend that the document was provisional, it is a revealing look at how Fiqi and his allies envision the future relationship between state and media in Egypt.

The draft law provides for the creation of the National Agency for the Regulation of Audio and Visual Broadcasting (NARAVB), with jurisdiction over all transmissions to the public through "telecommunication, cables or satellites, computer networks, digital media or any other broadcasting, communication, or provision mediums or techniques,"[23] a provision that clearly includes (but does not actually mention) the Internet.[24]

Should it come into being, the NARAVB will have the power to issue and withdraw media licences at its sole discretion. It will also be responsible for refining the code of ethics to be applied to media content, as well as monitoring output to ensure that the code is not broken and setting the criteria for determining which programmes can be beamed into Egypt from abroad. The agency's daily work will be handled by a Board of Executives, the chairman of which will be appointed by the minister of information. Overseeing their work will be a Board of Trustees, comprised of representatives of national security, military intelligence, and various ministries. The overall head of the agency is to be appointed by the prime minister on the recommendation of the minister of information.

The draft law allows for the prosecution of journalists and broadcasters for damaging "social peace, national unity, public order and society's values," with penalties including prison sentences ranging from one month to three years. Such elastic terms are a time-honored practice in authoritarian Arab regimes, as they allow for selective, arbitrary prosecutions.

Among the more sinister aspects of the NARAVB is its immunity to any kind of criticism. A blanket ban is to be applied to all discussion in the media of the body's activities, with breaches of this rule resulting in prison sentences, a move that will raise its status to that of a national security body.

The leak of the draft law sparked an uproar in Egypt and became the subject of much debate in the press and on television talk shows. ANHRI and a wide range of civil society groups rallied opposition to the law, which they see as a cynical attempt at strangling the burgeoning democracy movement in Egypt.

However, some Egyptian commentators say that regulation of the satellite television sector is long overdue. Hussein Y. Amin, an associate professor at American University in Cairo (AUC), argues that "satellite broadcasts from the Arab region that feature digital fatwas, satellite sheiks, and the promotion of superstition bordering on black magic" have had a deleterious impact on "relatively uneducated and unsophisticated Arab audiences."[25]

Naila Hamdy, a professor of journalism at AUC, offers a more measured assessment of the dangers. "Unregulated satellite [broadcasting] has brought fuelling of sectarian wars, political dissent and opposing views, but also challenges to customs and values . . . [and] all types of previously unheard of topics and subjects, not necessarily political," says Hamdy. "I believe that the main aim of the draft law is to regulate the media in a new environment and changing landscape. Yes, controlling political opposition and/or dissent may be a by-product, but that does not need a new media law."[26]

One vociferous supporter of the draft law from within the journalistic community is the editor of the state-owned Al-Ahram, Osama Saraya, who accused Al-Masry Al-Youm of stirring up unnecessary controversy by leaking a document that more established papers (such as his own) had seen but wisely chose not to publish.[27] Addressing the concerns of his colleagues, he added, "As far as I know, Egypt is not intending by any means to reduce the extent of freedom."[28]

But opponents counter that legitimate concerns about satellite broadcasting can best be resolved by a regulatory body composed of and chosen by representatives of the journalistic community. "There's been a lot of talk about doing something like the BBC, where there's an independent board whose members are not appointed by the government," says Muhammad Shawky, a producer at Video Cairo Sat, which supplies facilities to CNN and other international clients.[29]

Some argue that the legislation is flatly unworkable in an age where media outlets can easily re-channel their broadcasts to avoid censorship. "The law is a retrogression that will push the owners of satellite channels to transmit their channels from Malta and Cyprus," said one member of the old guard, former Minister of State for Culture and Information (1979-1981) Mansour Hassan, in an interview with Al-Masry Al-Youm.[30] This concern cannot be ignored, as the satellite television sector is becoming immensely lucrative. In the Middle East, transponder demand has been rising at 12% per annum and satellite lease revenues by 17% since 2003.[31]

Resistance and Prevarication

When the draft law was first leaked in Al-Masry Al-Youm, it was widely expected that the government would submit it in the next parliamentary session. However, the bill was not mentioned by either Fiqi or President Mubarak during the official opening of the new session on November 23, nor has it been timetabled for consideration in this session. What this means is a matter of some debate.

According to Eid, it does not mean the bill will not be put forward before the session ends in June 2009. "It seems likely that the government is trying to delay discussion of the bill until public reaction and opposition from journalists has died down," said Eid. "In our experience, we can go to bed one night and wake up the next morning to find that a bill has been debated and passed into law with no warning."[32] Considering the large parliamentary majority of the ruling National Democratic Party (NDP), the bill is unlikely to be defeated if and when it is voted on.

The delay may also reflect the regional climate. The fact that initiatives to implement the Arab League media charter in other countries have gone nowhere makes it problematic for Egypt to act unilaterally - broadcasting business gravitate to more accommodating regional locales. Arab information ministers noticeably avoided publicly discussing the charter when they met most recently in Damascus in mid-November. According to one report, they agreed behind closed doors to freeze it.[33]

Another factor in the government's apparent desire to delay the vote was the election of a new US administration on November 6. The issue of human rights, including freedom of speech, has been a long-running source of tension between the US and Egypt, with the former at times highly critical of Egypt's track record.

"I think the Egyptian government is concerned to some extent about the image it portrays to the outside world and to the United States," said Hafez Abu Seada, Secretary General of the Egyptian Organization for Human Rights, which has also been campaigning against the draft. "And so the way it is viewed by the incoming US administration may have an impact. If the new administration shows opposition, there is a slight chance the government may backtrack on its plans," he said.[34]

While it is unlikely that the government would abandon its plans altogether, it may be pressured into watering down some of the more draconian measures. However, Abu Seada says that any changes made are likely to be of little consequence.

If the law is enacted, that's not going to be the end of the fight. Journalists nervous about the new proposals take heart in a crticial historical precedent. The much-hated Press Law of 1996 was passed by parliament in the face of strong opposition from journalists, only to be repealed a year later by President Mubarak after continued protests. "It seems the government has learned no lessons; it always repeats the same mistake," said Abu Seada. "It may be that the law will be passed and then the president will have to intervene like he did with the Press Law of 1996."[35]

Whatever the fate of the draft law, most Egyptian analysts are confident that Egypt's media community will continue to defy government attempts to impose censorship. The willingness of journalists to push the boundaries of free speech irrespective of the consequences will most likely continue to grow even if the broadcasting law is passed, particularly if Western governments weigh in against it. "The genie is out of the bottle," says Hamdy, "so it is difficult to imagine that new laws are really going to cause Egyptian journalists to give up their newly gained freedoms."[36]

Notes

  [1] Interview with author, 12 July 2008.
  [2] The young lady who played the lead role, Israa Abdel Fattah, was released only after promising to take no further part in such activities. "Egypt detains Facebook activists - again," The Christian Science Monitor, 20 July 2008.
  [3] Quoted in Gamal Nkrumah and Mohamed El-Sayed, "Politicising the Internet," Al-Ahram Weekly (Cairo), 24-30 April 2008.
  [4] "Egypt blocks opposition website," Agence France Presse, 12 May 2008.
  [5] ANHRI, Egypt: Increase in Censorship and Internet Users' Privacy Violation, 9 August 2008. Online monitoring a violation of internet user privacy, says rights group, Daily News Egypt, 11 August 2008.
  [6] "Egypt asks mobile firms to bar anonymous users," Reuters, 5 May 2008.
  [7] "Egyptians ignore strike call by Facebook activists group," The Associated Press, 4 May 2008.
  [8] See Naomi Sakr "Privatization Alone Will Not Loosen Arab Governments' Grip on Broadcasting," Arab Reform Bulletin, December 2004.
  [9] Al-Masry Al-Youm (Cairo), 26 February 2008; Al-Quds al-Arabi (London), 6 March 2008.
  [10] Human Rights Watch, Egypt: Satellite Company Punished for Protest Footage, 24 May 2008. Al-Hiwar's schedule included "Peoples' Rights," a program on which human rights activists and victims of abuses discussed violations by Arab governments, including torture in Egypt, and "Egyptian Papers," a program on which Ibrahim Issa and other government critics appeared.
  [11] "Live broadcast spurs Jazeera arrests," Al-Ahram Weekly (Cairo), 19-25 May 2005.
  [12] Reporters sans frontiers (RSF) press release, "Government offensive against freedom of expression in TV broadcasting," 4 September 2008.
  [13] Lawrence Pintak, Reporting a revolution: the changing Arab media landscape, Arab Media & Society, February 2007.
  [14] "Analysis: Media freedom in Egypt at risk after Arab charter," BBC Monitoring, 11 April 2008.
  [15] The Committee to Protect Journalists, Arab governments move to restrict satellite TV, 15 February 2008.
  [16] "Arab media charter not meant to restrict freedom: Egypt," Agence France Presse, 18 February 2008.
  [17] Mohamed Shokry, "Arab governments seek tighter grip on satellite TV," BBC Monitoring, 14 February 2008.
  [18] For example, the Bahrain News Agency proclaimed that the charter will "put an end to the violations of some Arab channels which show trivial programmes on witchcraft and other sensational material." "Arab satellite transmission document," Bahrain News Agency, 19 February 2008.
  [19] "Egyptian independent, opposition press review," BBC Monitoring, 18 February 2008.
  [20] The charter is "a step backwards from the open and challenging developments in Arab satellite broadcasting of the past few years," said International Federation of Journalists (AFJ) General Secretary Aidan White. [International Federation of Journalists, IFJ Condemns Arab League Pact to Censor Satellite Broadcasters, 13 February 2008.] The Paris-based organization Reporters Sans Frontieres (RSF) called the new regulations "not only repressive but also retrograde." [Reporters Sans Frontieres, Arab League adopts strict rules for satellite TV stations, 13 February 2008.]
  [21] "Arab League working on guidebook for language to be used by TV networks, news Web sites," The Associated Press, 19 June 2008.
  [22] Al-Masry Al-Youm (Cairo), 9 July 2008. An English translation of the draft law is available at http://www.arabmediasociety.com/?article=684
  [23] Ibid.
  [24] "Egypt Media Under Renewed Attack by State," Middle East Times, 18 July 2008.
  [25] Hussein Y. Amin , The Arab States Charter for Satellite Television: A quest for regulation, Arab Media & Society, March 2008.
  [26] Interview with author, 23 July 2008.
  [27] "The draft law is known to major newspapers, but small newspapers want to make it a main issue," he said. Dear, Osama Saraya? Here Are You This Honor! Al-Masry Al-Youm (English Translation), 16 July 2008.
  [28] Osama Saraya Attacks Al-Masry Al-Youm for Publishing the Law of Audio-Visual Transmission; Dubs it the 'Petty Journal', Al-Masry Al-Youm (English Translation), 15 July 2008.
  [29] Interview with author, 21 July 2008.
  [30] Al-Masry Al-Youm's Scoop of Publishing Transmission Draft Law Arouses Wide Reactions, Al-Masry Al-Youm (English translation), 10 July 2008.
  [31] Nilesat is booked solid, Rapidtvnews.com, 22 October 2008.
  [32] Interview with author, 24 November 2008.
  [33] "Arab ministers call for media, IT integration," Daily News Egypt, 18 November 2008.
  [34] Interview with author, 24 November 2008.
  [35] Interview with author, 24 November 2008.
  [36] Interview with author, 23 July 2008.