Peter Ajemian is a New York-based research analyst and a contributing editor for the journal Arab Media & Society.

Lebanon's Internal Security Forces (ISF) are emerging as a powerful state institution at one of the most politically charged times in the country's history. While generous provisions of international aid have strengthened and diversified the functional capacities of the ISF, its development into a viable law enforcement organization has been hampered by accusations that it serves partisan domestic and international interests.

Prospects for long-term security in Lebanon will ultimately rest upon the ISF's ability to conduct operations in close coordination with the country's other security institutions. The information sharing and inter-agency cooperation necessary for such action, however, has fallen victim to divisive confessional politics unique to the Lebanese system.

Background

Although the ISF is nominally in charge of domestic law enforcement in Lebanon, in practice it has played a subordinate role for decades. The constitution (as amended by the 1989 Taif Accord) gives the army a mandate to "protect public order . . . when the danger is such that it exceeds the capacity of the internal security forces,"[1] a role it assumed in practice (however ineffectively) during the 1975-1990 civil war. After the war, the occupying Syrians favored the army and other security institutions less subject to civilian oversight.[2]

Following the Syrian withdrawal and narrow electoral victory of the March 14 coalition in 2005, the new Lebanese government set about expanding the ISF from an auxiliary force tasked with maintaining public order to an agency capable of undertaking proactive investigative and counterterrorism functions. The ISF, which falls under the direct authority of the interior minister, was the one major security institution that Saad Hariri's largely Sunni Muslim Future Movement was free to thoroughly revamp at its own discretion.

Foreign Aid

The new government of Prime Minister Fouad Siniora presided over a massive expansion of the ISF from around 13,000 officers to 24,000, a qualitative and quantitative transformation made possible by foreign assistance from the US, EU member states, and Gulf Arab states. The EU's assistance to the ISF most recently included plans to construct a training center for investigation and crime scene analysis,[3] while Germany has played a pivotal role in the creation of the Common Border Force, an intra-agency effort aimed at increasing the effectiveness of border control operations.[4]

However, the most publicized source of assistance has come from Washington. A $60 million aid program initiated in October 2007 provides for the training of nearly 10,000 ISF officers by American instructors over four years in a comprehensive array of skills ranging from arrest and search methods to advanced investigative techniques.[5] The ISF has also received much needed equipment, such as a few hundred vehicles and riot control gear.[6]

US efforts to enhance Lebanon's security sector are not exclusive to the ISF. American aid to the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) is even higher,[7] with $220 million earmarked last year.[8] Nevertheless, US material aid to the army has been mostly non-lethal (save for ammunition), for fear that weapons might end up being used against Israel or transferred to non-state groups.[9] This led to complaints from soldiers and officers alike after the outbreak of the Nahr al-Bared uprising in the summer of 2007, when even Army Commander (now President) Michel Suleiman bitterly criticized Washington.[10] While $410 million dollars has been earmarked since 2006 for the LAF by Washington, less than half of this has been delivered.[11]

American patronage has contributed to the widespread perception that the ISF is an instrument of US policy - in sharp contrast to the perceived neutrality of the military. Indeed, March 14 and opposition politicians alike openly acknowledge that US assistance is intended to neutralize Iranian influence.[12] While many Lebanese enthusiastically support this goal, a great many do not. Asked to name which country poses the greatest threat to Lebanon in a November 2006 Gallup poll, a majority of Sunni and Shiite respondents said the United States, not Iran or Syria.[13]

Despite the political baggage that comes with US assistance, the ISF, much like other entities within Lebanon's security sector, is in need of foreign aid. While the long-term impact of US assistance specifically has yet to be determined, some indicate that training programs have already had a positive influence on the ISF's capacity in conducting routine, yet essential, duties; namely managing a crime scene, conducting investigations, and directing traffic.[14] The ISF's relatively effective (albeit very belated) handling of an auto theft surge in Metn over the summer suggests that US training programs are beginning to play a substantive positive role.[15]

Leadership, Recruitment, and Composition

Amid growing political and sectarian polarization between pro-government and opposition blocs, the ISF has acquired a reputation for being a partisan institution at the service of Hariri;[16] some in the opposition camp have even labeled it a 'militia'.[17] Although such charges may be oversimplified or exaggerated, ISF recruitment patterns and personnel changes within its leadership have contributed to this stigma.

The ISF is under the authority of the interior minister, a post held by two Sunnis allied with Hariri (Hassan Sabah and Ahmad Fatfat) until the formation of a national unity government this past summer. After the assassination of Rafiq Hariri in February 2005, the pro-Syrian head of the ISF resigned[18] and was replaced by Gen.[19] Ashraf Rifi, a Sunni close to Hariri. Rifi's appointment brought a period of restructuring that sidelined the old ISF leadership and centralized various branches under his control,[20] particularly the Information Branch (IB), which reportedly has ties to the Hariri family dating back to the early 1990s.[21] The coalition took these decisions unilaterally, rebuffing opposition calls for parliamentary oversight of security sector reform.

There has been a pronounced, if not overwhelming, sectarian bias in ISF recruitment since the Syrian withdrawal. As the ISF has doubled in size over the past three years, the percentage of Shiites in the service has declined.[22] While Sunnis may remain an overall minority in the service,[23] specialized units, such as the Fohoud, are reported to be overwhelmingly Sunni.[24]

While the ISF's disproportionately Sunni recruitment and close relationship with the Hariri family have helped feed the ISF's image as a pseudo-Sunni militia,[25] it is important to bear in mind that Lebanon's other security institutions have their own particular sectarian imbalances. Christians hold disproportionate power in the officer corps of the LAF and military intelligence, which have come under suspicion of harboring sympathies for Christian opposition leader Michel Aoun, a former army commander. Moreover, the rank and file of the LAF are disproportionately Shiite (up to 60% by some estimates), albeit not by design. This effectively rules out any army action inimical to the Lebanese Shiite Hezbollah movement, which has refused to disband its powerful militia in spite of the withdrawal of Israeli and Syrian forces. Indeed, support for Hezbollah among ordinary Shiites is arguably so strong as to raise questions about whether a confessionally balanced security force (i.e. roughly 35-40% Shiite) can be relied upon to enforce the law when Hezbollah's vital interests are concerned.

However, a confessionally imbalanced force runs into a different problem - a unit perceived to be pro-Sunni runs the risk of enflaming sectarian animosities whenever it acts against Shiite groups. Thus, the military and the ISF were equally impotent during the Hezbollah-led takeover of West Beirut in May 2008.[26] On at least one occasion, Hezbollah operatives have even detained and interrogated ISF personnel who interfered with their activities.[27]

Critics of the March 14 coalition have also suggested that the ISF's sectarian and political loyalties are an impediment to confronting Sunni Islamists. During the "cartoon riots" of February 2006, ISF riot police stood by as Sunni protestors torched a building housing the Danish embassy. Fallout from this event led to the resignation of then-Interior Minister Hassan Sabah.[28] The ISF's inability to contain the growth of Fatah al-Islam and other foreign Salafi-jihadist groups has also been attributed to its Sunni orientation. Some have even claimed that the ISF has secretly aided jihadist groups in hope of building a Sunni counterweight to Hezbollah, most notably American Pulitzer Prize winning investigative journalist Seymour M. Hersh.[29]

Opposition media outlets portray the ISF as a patronage network based not on merit, but on political loyalty and sect.[30] In particular, the leftist daily Al-Akhbar[31] has gone to great lengths to challenge its professionalism, motives, and capabilities as a security force. Its articles are often rich in details and statistics, such as the number and nature of ISF arrests.[32] Al-Akhbar reports have accused the ISF of everything from lowering test requirements for promotions[33] to inappropriate conduct towards women.[34]

Challenges to Intelligence Gathering

While perceptions of the ISF as a tool of partisan domestic and international interests are symptomatic of Lebanon's political climate,[35] they have challenged its ability to develop the intelligence capabilities of the Information Branch. This is true in terms of both its ability to draw human intelligence assets from 'politically opposed' constituencies and its ability to utilize intelligence collected by other entities. This greatly hinders the execution of intelligence-driven missions, such as counterterrorism. While foreign assistance may provide the ISF with important tools to maintain order and conduct investigations, cooperation with other Lebanese intelligence services remains at the mercy of a politicized security environment.

Accordingly, it comes to no surprise that negative public perceptions of the ISF have elicited tensions between the ISF and other security institutions not controlled by the March 14 coalition - particularly the military and the General Security Directorate (GSD), which have officers close to Hezbollah, Amal, and the Christian opposition.

Lack of cooperation from other security agencies has been most noticeable in reaction to the March 14 coalition's efforts to bolster the ISF's intelligence arm, the Information Branch (IB).[36] Developing the 'in-house' intelligence capabilities of the ISF is critical to assuming a proactive role in counterterrorism operations. Particularly important is its ability to access information collected by other security branches, especially the GSD, which is in charge of passport control and other repositories of vital data. In the fall of 2006, Fatfat tried to establish a central database for information sharing between the ISF and other domestic intelligence bodies, principally the GSD.[37]

While Fatfat's proposal was a textbook security sector reform initiative, it was labeled a 'coup' attempt by opposition media[38] and flatly rejected by GSD director Wafiq Jezzini and other non-ISF security officials, who allege that Washington was using the ISF to keep tabs on Hezbollah activities[39] and had encouraged the Fatfat initiative.[40] Although there is no way to substantiate this claim, some indicate that Fatfat's database would have provided intelligence to UNIFIL, presenting a potential threat to Hezbollah and Syria.[41] Reports that the GSD itself has been penetrated by Western intelligence agencies hunting for information on Hezbollah has perhaps only further fed hesitations over the issue of intelligence sharing.[42]

Bombings targeting key figures within the IB only further underscore that it has come to be perceived by some quarters as an instrument of partisan domestic or international forces. This has included Samir Shehadeh, who escaped an assassination attempt in September of 2006, and Wissam Eid who was killed in January of 2008 after surviving a previous attempt on his life.[43] In such an atmosphere, there is insufficient institutional trust for intelligence sharing in Lebanon's security sector.[44]

Performance

At the end of the day, the one thing most ordinary Lebanese privilege over loyalty to clan and sect is the desire for security - perhaps the most important factor influencing public perceptions of the ISF is its performance. Despite the nominal improvements that have come with foreign assistance, the ISF has proven ineffective at handling a variety of internal security threats - most notably the recurrent assassinations of Lebanese public figures since the Syrian withdrawal. According to statistics published in Al-Akhbar, car thefts in Mount Lebanon in mid-2008 had increased ten-fold over the past year (according to opposition MPs from the region, this is because the ISF presence was reduced).[45]

The most widely criticized blunder by the ISF was its failure to give advance warning to the army before launching its first large-scale counter-terrorism raid since the Syrian withdrawal. The May 2007 raid on a Fatah al-Islam safe house in Tripoli was not only botched,[46] but led militants to retaliate with a devastating surprise attack on Lebanese soldiers stationed outside its headquarters in the Nahr al-Bared refugee camp.[47] A summer of bloody fighting in which 168 soldiers lost their lives solidified the credibility of the army in the eyes of the Lebanese,[48] but reinforced perceptions of the ISF as unable to cope with serious security threats.[49] While eradicating the militants from fortified positions eventually required the army's involvement, the saga should have been avoided considering that fact that the group was on the ISF's radar.

After Doha

If nothing else, the Nahr al-Bared disaster highlighted the need for a strong internal security force to act in conjunction with the military. After the fighting, the ISF and the LAF took concrete steps to coordinate their counter-terrorism efforts, such as joint training exercises[50] and even joint security operations.[51] Hoping to capitalize on the surge in public support for the army, the ISF went to great lengths publicizing this cooperation. Posters and billboards made by the ISF appeared across Lebanon in late 2007, showing the insignias of the ISF and the army under the banner, "Together we protect."[52] The cover of the December 2007 issue of the ISF's Security magazine featured members of the ISF and LAF under the headline, "Together we protect the nation and safeguard security."[53]

The domestic political thaw that ensued after the May 2008 Doha Accord has already had some positive effects. The interior minister in Lebanon's new national unity government, Ziad Baroud, is a respected Christian human rights attorney mutually acceptable to both March 14 and the opposition. The most noticeable change, which one Western news agency called "something of a revolution," is that police are rigorously enforcing traffic laws for the first time.[54] The ISF's recent coordination with the army in subduing violence in Tripoli[55] has also won widespread acclaim and provided momentum for progressively closer cooperation in the future.[56] Coordinated operations between the army and the ISF in response to the Tripoli bombings of August and September of 2008 further suggest that such a relationship is taking shape under the new cabinet.[57] Nonetheless, the ability of the ISF and army to establish a cooperative preemptive capability that relies upon interagency intelligence sharing - the next benchbark in building the security sector - remains limited.

Conclusion

While initial improvements can be seen with the relative downturn in tensions following Doha, a period of sustained political normalization is needed to truly facilitate a more assertive and effective ISF role in providing security. As the issue of intelligence vividly demonstrates, the viability of the ISF, and that of Lebanon's security sector as a whole, has been hamstrung by a security culture defined by mistrust and factionalism. This presents serious obstacles to the cooperative efforts that will be necessary to maintain internal security.

In the meantime, there are steps that should be taken towards reforming Lebanon's security sector and the ISF in lieu of any normalization or internal agreement over Hezbollah's long-term role in Lebanese security matters. Although a number of adjustments will undoubtedly have to be initiated from within the ISF, especially those addressing its image, foreign assistance needs to be continued, despite its propensity for playing into internal political debates. Placing an equal emphasis on aid to the LAF and other institutions could help alleviate the political 'ramifications' of this process.

Overall, the nature of the Lebanese situation - where both confessional politics and the strategic interests of international actors protrude into the country's institutions - will continue to challenge the development of a cohesive and truly 'national' security establishment. As the ISF case study suggests, the benefits of foreign aid and training may be fully realized only if organizational, domestic, and regional trends allow them to be.

Notes
[all translations of Arabic titles are by this author]

  [1] Edouard Belloncle, "Prospects of SSR in Lebanon," Journal of Security Sector Management, November 2006, p. 6.
  [2] Emile El-Hokayem and Elana McGovern, "Towards a More Secure and Stable Lebanon: Prospects for Security Sector Reform," The Henry L. Stimson Center, February 2008, p. 11.
  [3] "EU, ISF tout plans for facility to train law enforcement," The Daily Star (Beirut), 9 July 2008.
  [4] El-Hokayem and McGovern, p. 11.
  [5] "Americans tout promise of efforts to train ISF officers in police work," The Daily Star (Beirut), 9 September 2008.
  [6] See United States Assistant Secretary of State David T. Johnson visits Lebanon, US State Department Press Release, 31 March 2008. For riot-gear see, U.S Delivers 20 HMMWVs to the Lebanese Armed Forces, US State Department Press Release, 12 January 2007.
  [7] Michael Fabey, "Bush Administration's interest in Lebanon growing, CRC says," Aerospace Daily & Defense Report, Vol. 223, Issue 20, 30 July 2007.
  [8] See El-Hokayem and McGovern, pp. 35-36.
  [9] See Nicholas Blanford, In Lebanon, soldiers win new respect, The Christian Science Monitor, 28 August 2007.
  [10] "We need weapons, conventional and advanced ammunition," said Gen. Suleiman in August 2007. "We didn't get anything but promises and best wishes and some ammunition, but no equipment. It's as though they are telling us, 'die first and assistance will follow'." Ibid.
  [11] "U.S. is resupplying Lebanon's Military in Effort to Stabilize a Strategic Ally," The New York Times, 26 October 2008.
  [12] For example, Hezbollah's Al-Manar TV has recently devoted significant coverage to US aid to the ISF. For example see, The background of American Aid to the ISF (Arabic), Almanar.com.lb, 4 July 2008; and New American Aid to the Lebanese ISF (Arabic), Almanar.com.lb, 5 June 2008. Also see former interim Interior Minister Ahmed Fatfat's comments on this issue in "Lebanon builds up security forces; The move is seen as a bid to counter Iran and Shiite ally Hezbollah," The Los Angeles Times, 1 December 2006.
  [13] "Poll shows divide between Lebanon's Shiite and other communities," Agence France Presse, 1 December 2006.
  [14] American Interventionism, Nowlebanon.com, 4 July 2008.
  [15] Benjamin Ryan, Closing the Gap, Nowlebanon, 11 July 2008.
  [16] Jim Quilty, The Collateral Damage of Lebanese Sovereignty, Middle East Report Online, 18 June 2007, accessible from: .
  [17] Perhaps the most publicized example of this occurred in October 2007, when leaders of the Free Patriotic Movement described the Information Branch as a militia after two of their constituents were arrested. See, "FPM MPs denounce ISF intelligence unit as 'militia'," The Daily Star (Beirut), 5 October 2007. In November 2007, Talal Arslan of the Lebanese Democratic Party reportedly made similar remarks in response to an arrest made by the ISF's Information Branch. See After attacks on members of an ISF patrol in Aramoun, Arslan: 'The Intelligence Branch is 'a street corner gang' and militia of the ruling authority in official uniform' (Arabic), Al-Mustaqbal (Beirut), 2 November 2007.
  [18] For the resignation of these officials see, Lebanon security chiefs step down, BBC, 22 April 2005. For their arrest, see "Top Lebanese security officials arrested over murder of Hariri," The Independent (London), 31 August 2008.
  [19] Note that Ali Hajj, the previous head of the ISF implicated in the Hariri assassination, was also a Sunni. For more on the relationship between Rifi and Hariri see, 'Awad, Ibrahim, "Information about the Information Branch". 'Awad alleges that Hariri wanted Rifi to take over as the head of the Information Branch at the beginning of his second term in 2000, but was unsuccessful in doing so. Before this he states that Rifi headed the Information Branch during Hariri's first term in office, but reportedly faced hardships and repeatedly voiced his disagreement with Syrian officials. Subsequently, he was allegedly dismissed from his position and given a different post around the conclusion of Hariri's first term in 1998.
  [20] Benjamin Ryan, Securing Internal Security, Nowlebanon.com, 12 November 2007.
  [21] Ibrahim Awad, Information about the Information Branch (Arabic), Al-Akhbar, 19 September 2006.
  [22] Ibid; "West helps Lebanon build militia to fight Hezbollah," The Globe and Mail (Canada), 1 December 2006.
  [23] El-Hokayem and McGovern, p. 23.
  [24] See Jim Quilty, Lebanon's Brush with Civil War, Middle East Report Online, 20 May 2008.
  [25] See Timor Goksel's comments in, "Lebanon builds up security forces; The move is seen as a bid to counter Iran and Shiite ally Hezbollah, The Los Angeles Times, 1 December 2006.
  [26] See Quilty, "Lebanon's Brush with Civil War." For the implications of Shiites in the LAF vis-a-vis Hezbollah, see Nicholas Blanford, "Analysis: why Hezbollah will not be disarmed," The Times (London), 16 August 2006.
  [27] Maria Abi-Habib, Divided Lebanon debates federalism, Aljazeera.net, 12 July 2007.
  [28] See Gary C. Gambill, Islamist Groups in Lebanon, Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 11, No. 4, 2007, p. 49. Also see, Lebanon minister quits over riot, BBC, 6 February 2006.
  [29] Hersh reported in March 2007 that the ISF had provided arms to Asbat al-Ansar, an Al-Qaeda-affiliated Sunni terrorist group. Seymour M. Hersh, "The Redirection: Is the Administration's new policy benefiting our enemies in the war on terrorism?" The New Yorker, 5 March 2007.
  [30] Omar Nashabeh, Political and Sectarian Employment Threatens the ISF Institution (Arabic), Al-Akhbar (Beirut), 19 November 2007. 1463 members of the ISF to protect individuals: 'Sectarianism' supercedes 'Qualifications', Al-Akhbar (Beirut), 26 March 2007.
  [31] Although a relatively new publication, Al-Akhbar has gained significant popularity in a short period of time, competing for the spot as Lebanon's third most popular paper with Al-Diyar. It claims to be the most visited Lebanese newspaper on the Internet. Although it is often described as a pro-opposition media outlet, others tend to highlight its coverage of more progressive issues. See A new way of doing journalism", MENASSAT, 4 August 2008.
  [32] Reading into statistics on the ISF: to what extent did the crime rate decrease in 2006? (Arabic), Al-Akhbar (Beirut), 11 November 2007.
  [33] For the lowering of test requirements see Hassan Aleeq, '7 over 20' the passing grade in the ISF (Arabic), Al-Akhbar (Beirut), 28 February 2008.
  [34] For conduct towards women see On the relationship between the Police and Women: harrassment awaits being disciplined (Arabic), Al-Akhbar (Beirut), 5 May 2008.
  [35] Note that several of these articles appeared in Al-Akhbar in October and November of 2007, shortly after the Information Branch made unpopular arrests against members of the opposition-allied Free Patriotic Movement, and during the initial stages of Lebanon's presidential crisis. For more on these arrests see Political Explosion between the Free Patriotic Movement and the Information Branch (Arabic), Al-Akhbar (Beirut), 5 October 2007.
  [36] For example see, 'Awad and Ryan.
  [37] Fatfat: Resolution 2403 will be executed and what is going on is an political assassination attempt (Arabic), Al-Mustaqbal (Beirut), 21 September 2006.
  [38] The thwarting of Fatfat's 'coup' and the freezing of resolution 2403 (Arabic), Al-Akhbar (Beirut), 21 September 2006.
  [39] This is according to comments made by an unnamed Lebanese security official cited in "Special unit led raid; Lebanese group's attack set off fighting at Palestinian refugee camp," Newsday, 31 May 2007.
  [40] The public's security to be achieved through consensus, not allotment . . . and [the same goes for] the security establishment as well (Arabic), Al-Akhbar (Beirut), 19 June 2008.
  [41] "Hizbullah assails Fatfat over security reform," The Daily Star (Beirut), 22 September 2006.
  [42] In February 2007, Al-Safir reported that a European Intelligence agency recruited a member of the General Security to monitor Hezbollah centers, institutions, and military positions. The Al-Safir article was cited in Network Spying on Hizbullah Discovered, Naharnet.com, 7 February 2007.
  [43] See Hariri investigator escapes assassination in Lebanon, The Times (London), 5 September 2006; Blast Kills Lebanese Terrorism Investigator Who Was Probing Assassinations, The Associated Press, 26 January 2008.
  [44] For more on the role of institutional trust see, Criminal Intelligence Sharing: A National Plan for Intelligence-led Policing at the Local, State, and Federal Levels, Recommendations from the IACP Intelligence Summit, August 2002, p. 14.
  [45] Al-Akhbar, 10 July 2008; Closing the Gap, Nowlebanon.com, 11 July 2008.
  [46] Quilty, 2007.
  [47] According to Nir Rosen, although Internal Security Force was close to a Lebanese army base, and the the army was surrounding the camp, the ISF did not notify the army about the raids in Tripoli, but did notify two Lebanese television stations. See Nir Rosen, "Al Qaeda in Lebanon: The Iraq War spreads," The Boston Review, January/February 2008. Also see Gary C. Gambill, Islamist Groups in Lebanon, Volume 11, No. 4, 2007, p. 51.
  [48] Rodger Shanahan, "A Pyrrhic Victory? Hezbollah's Complex Post-War Environment", Democracy and Security, Vol 4, No. 1, January 2008, p. 40.
  [49] For this 'dependency' see, El-Hokayem and McGovern, pg. 14.
  [50] Author's translation of "Cooperation between the army and the ISF: 141 officer students from the Military Academy visited a compound of the ISF's mobile unit in Dbayeh," Security, February 2008, accessible here.
  [51] For example, the Information Branch of the ISF reportedly coordinated arrests with the LAF of individuals suspected of being tied to Fatah al-Islam near the port city of Saida. Those arrested in the Taamir quarter in Saida belong to Fatah al-Islam . . . and are involved in the bombings in Kfar Falous (Arabic), Al-Mustaqbal (Beirut), 14 August 2007.
  [52] Author's observations on the Dawra Highway near the East Beirut neighborhood of Karantina in January of 2008.
  [53] See the December 2007 issue of the ISF's Security magazine.
  [54] "Lights turn red on Lebanese traffic offences," Agence France Presse, 22 October 2008.
  [55] See Security meeting in Tripoli and the army promises to be firm, Aljazeera.net, 26 July 2008.
  [56] In delivering his recent six-point plan for the current Tripoli crisis, Prime Minister Fouad Siniora stated, "the government is seriously asking security institutions to play their role in re-establishing stability." See "Siniora pitches six-point plan to address Tripoli crisis," The Daily Star (Beirut), 3 September 2008.
  [57] "Army arrests suspects in Tripoli blasts," Agence France Presse, 13 October 2008.