Three months ago, Lebanese Druze leader Walid Jumblatt was hands-down the most popular Lebanese politician (and arguably the most popular Arab politician) among the American foreign policy establishment. Few in Lebanon were more supportive of US policy, more antagonistic toward Syria and Iran, or more opposed to the Lebanese Shiite Islamist Hezbollah movement. His periodic trips to Washington were met with rapturous receptions that were the envy of many heads of state.

Today, Jumblatt has confounded his American supporters by sharply criticizing Lebanon's ruling March 14 coalition, softening his objection to Hezbollah's arms, and raising the banner of Arab nationalism. Last month, he exuberantly embraced Samir Quntar, a recently released Lebanese terrorist best known for beating a four year-old Israeli girl to death with a rock, as a national "hero."

Jumblatt's turnabout is the latest in a series of sweeping political realignments (both foreign and domestic) that have defined his political career. His militant pro-Americanism was a very recent phenomenon, emerging in late 2004 as international and regional pressure on Syria reached a critical mass. Just months earlier, Jumblatt had been trying to curry favor with the Syrians by denouncing the United States, going so far as to declare that "the killing of US soldiers in Iraq is legitimate and obligatory."[1]

After the withdrawal of Syrian forces in April 2005, Jumblatt won over many American skeptics by repeatedly torpedoing "lowest common denominator" political compromises in Lebanon that threatened to undermine US strategic interests (e.g. by shelving the issue of Hezbollah's disarmament). Few seemed to appreciate that Jumblatt's interests in doing so were decidedly parochial. A national unity government would have nullified the occupation-era gerrymandering that greatly inflated his parliamentary strength (by embedding Christian areas in Druze-dominated districts), while an end to Shiite-Sunni tensions would have reduced Jumblatt's value as an ally of Saad Hariri's Future Movement.

It was for this reason that Jumblatt (reportedly with strong encouragement from Washington) pressured his allies in the March 14 coalition to issue a controversial May 2008 decree declaring Hezbollah's telecommunications network to be "illegal and unconstitutional." Insofar as this initiative threatened to significantly undermine its military readiness, he could not possibly have imagined that Hezbollah would take it sitting down. However, Jumblatt clearly did not anticipate the ease and rapidity with which Hezbollah routed his Druze militiamen and seized control of strategic positions in his home district of the Shouf (as pro-March 14 Sunni militiamen melted away before Hezbollah's advance into West Beirut). To make matters worse, rather than aborting prospects for a political settlement, Hezbollah's power play led the outside Arab world and Lebanon's commercial elite to push harder for one. Sensitive to the considerations of its Arab allies, the Bush administration stood by as Qatari-mediated negotiations produced a compromise package less advantageous to Jumblatt than many that had been rejected previously.

Under the Doha Accord's redistricting provisions for parliamentary elections next year, Jumblatt's Progressive Socialist Party (PSP) stands to lose a large chunk of its seats should Hezbollah and Michel Aoun's predominantly Christian Free Patriotic Movement (FPM) form a joint electoral coalition with his Druze rival, Talal Arslan. With new elections less than a year away, Jumblatt's political future suddenly hinged on reaching an accommodation with the opposition that would avert such a head-to-head electoral battle in 2009. American support would not be sufficient to see him past this hurdle.

Since the signing of the accord, Jumblatt has softened his objections to Hezbollah's arms.[2] When Hezbollah won the release of Quntar and other Lebanese detainees in Israel, the PSP issued a statement calling it "a historic victory" in the "long struggle against the Israeli enemy," while urging the public to participate in public celebrations.[3]

Meanwhile, the Druze leader has begun openly criticizing his erstwhile political allies. In a July 27 interview, he warned that the March 14 coalition had become "sequestered in an isolationist position," was overly focused on "taking revenge [against Syria] under the slogan of justice," and had "purposefully forgotten the Palestinian cause." In a startling (if oblique) swipe at Saad Hariri, Jumblatt complained that "the owners of private jets fund extremist militias in Lebanon."[4]

Although opposition media outlets in Lebanon have spoken hopefully of Jumblatt defecting completely from March 14 to the opposition,[5] this appears unlikely at present. However, his reconciliation with Arslan will mandate that he gravitate toward neutrality, at least until the 2009 elections.

Notes

  [1] Al-Sharq Al-Awsat (London), 12 February 2004. For a good overview of Jumblatt's other anti-American statements, see Steven Stalinsky, Viva La Lebanese Hatred, FrontPageMagazine.com, 20 December 2004.
  [2] A source close to Jumblatt told a Lebanese newspaper that the Druze leader joined Berri in pushing for Hezbollah's arms to be "discussed during upcoming dialogue sessions rather than meetings to compile the ministerial statement." "Ministers wrangle over official stance on Hizbullah's arms," The Daily Star (Beirut), 25 July 2008.
  [3] "Berri, Jumblatt Urge Lebanese to Welcome Prisoners Home," The Daily Star, 16 July 2008.
  [4] New TV (Beirut), 27 July 2008. A translated excerpt is available at http://www.nowlebanon.com/NewsArticleDetails.aspx?ID=52875# . See also "PSP dismisses reports of Jumblatt parting ways with March 14 forces," The Daily Star, 29 July 2008.
  [5] Al-Safir (Beirut), 28 July 2008.