Briefing: The National Intelligence Estimate on Iran

The declassification of key judgments from the new US National Intelligence Estimate on Iran has significant implications that far outweigh those of its substantive content. Whatever its merits, the report's conclusion that Iran "halted its nuclear weapons program" over four years ago effectively eliminates the possibility of an American military strike against Tehran.

The NIE is likely to complicate American efforts to sanction Iran for its ongoing uranium enrichment program and to unite Arab governments against their Persian counterpart. However, by signaling unmistakably to the Iranian people that American military action is off the table, the NIE findings could help create an Iranian political climate more conducive to moderation down the road.

The Report

A National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) is an interagency report that represents the consensus view of all 16 US federal intelligence agencies on a particular national security issue. Although NIEs are classified, their key judgments are sometimes declassified (as was the case with the 2002 NIE on Iraq) and often leaked to the media. An earlier NIE on Iran, leaked to The Washington Post in 2005, concluded that Iran was determined to produce nuclear weapons and had a covert program in place (beyond its declared civilian nuclear energy program) to achieve this goal. It estimated that the Islamic Republic was at least ten years away from producing a nuclear weapon - contrasting with White House warnings that Iran could have a bomb in 5 years (an estimate that had been essentially unchanged since the mid-1990s).[1]

Preparation of the new NIE had been in the works for about a year, driven by a broad reevaluation of existing intelligence and a substantial influx of new intelligence. The latter is rumored to include intercepts of official Iranian government correspondence, a seized journal documenting the country's suspension of weapons research, and information gleaned from the apparent defection of Ali Reza Asgari, a former deputy defense minister who disappeared during a February 2007 visit to Turkey.

Ironically, the effort to secure defections and other new outlets of intelligence was instigated by the White House in hopes of gathering stronger evidence of a covert Iranian program to build a nuclear bomb. As recently as 2006, according to investigative journalist Seymour Hersh, "a highly classified draft assessment by the CIA" had "found no conclusive evidence, as yet, of a secret Iranian nuclear weapons program."[2]

The new NIE contains two overarching conclusions about Iranian actions and Iranian intentions. First, it judges "with high confidence" that "Tehran halted its nuclear weapons program" in the fall of 2003 (and with "moderate confidence" that it has not been resumed). Second, the 140-page report concludes that Iran is "less determined to develop nuclear weapons than we have been judging since 2005."[3] Since only the "key judgments" of the overall report have been declassified, it's not entirely clear how these conclusions were reached.

The first conclusion refers to weaponization, not the process of uranium enrichment that can be used to make fuel for the bomb. The distinction is critical, because the main hurdle to producing a nuclear weapon is producing a sufficient quantity of fissionable material, not producing the complex machinery needed to detonate it. The new NIE says that Iran's continuing enrichment of uranium could be sufficient to produce a nuclear bomb by the middle of next decade (essentially the same estimate as its predecessor). The declassified passages do not specify which weaponization programs were halted or whether dual use programs were halted, nor do they explain how the halt will affect the overall time table of Iran's pursuit of nuclear weapons.

This last lacuna is significant. Since it is not clear how "costly" the halt was (in terms of producing a nuclear weapon), the report's conclusion that Iran is less determined to build one does not follow from the key judgments (though it may be substantiated in classified portions of the report). Strong determination to produce a bomb is consistent with a suspension of covert weaponization programs in response to increased international scrutiny (which spiked following the exposure of Iran's covert enrichment program by an opposition group in 2002) and the US-led invasion of neighboring Iraq in March 2003. Indeed, since the timetable for uranium enrichment is much longer than that for weaponization, running covert weaponization programs (at the risk they will be discovered) is arguably irrational at Iran's stage of uranium enrichment even if producing a bomb is its main priority.

The Fallout

The White House was clearly not happy with the NIE's reading of Iranian intentions,[4] but it decided to declassify the main findings anyway because they almost certainly would have eventually been leaked to the media.[5] Whatever its merit, the NIE made it effectively impossible (barring some unforeseen provocation) for the Bush administration to undertake military action against Iran. [6] Even before its release, a poll showed that just 52% of likely voters in the US favored the use of military force to prevent Iran from building a nuclear weapon.[7] In view of the NIE's conclusion that Iran no longer has a nuclear weapons program, no amount of White House talk about the dangers of Iranian uranium enrichment could possibly convince a skeptical and war weary public to support military action.

Moreover, with the American intelligence establishment certifying that Iran has halted illicit nuclear activity, a military strike would offend international and regional sensibilities on an order of magnitude that would dwarf the invasion of Iraq. Even the most strident neoconservative American hawks now grudgingly concede that the military option is no longer feasible.

Not surprisingly, the aforementioned have accused the intelligence establishment of what Charles Krauthammer called a "spectacularly successful coup" to wrest control over Iran policy.[8] Much ink was spilled about the State Department backgrounds and pro-engagement views of three senior intelligence officials involved in writing the report.[9]

However, it is important to bear in mind that the NIE represents the consensus view of all national intelligence agencies. Whatever its authorship, the fact that this particular text made it through so many institutional and bureaucratic checks means that intelligence professionals overwhelmingly have a different interpretation of Iranian behavior than neoconservative hawks. It also suggests that resistance to this process within the administration was less than might be expected.

Indeed, support for military action within the administration was already ebbing before the report came out. A dovish wing of the administration, led by Defense Secretary Robert Gates and Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, was said to be winning out over Vice-President Dick Cheney and others who favored an attack on Iran during the last year of Bush's term. The former feared that attacking Iran would lead to disastrous consequences in Iraq and Lebanon (where Iranian supported Shiite groups wield considerable influence) and enflame anti-American sentiment throughout the region.

During the summer of 2007, hawks within the administration continued to privately press for Bush to reconsider use of military force, while their allies outside of government made the case publicly.[10] There were even reports that Cheney aide David Wurmser proposed to other conservatives that Israel be pressed to make a limited strike on an Iranian nuclear facility at Natanz in hopes that Iranian retaliation would provide a pretext for comprehensive American strikes.[11] This led many at home and abroad to believe that military force was still on the table, which perhaps was precisely the point. In pressing European governments to sign off on stronger economic sanctions against Iran, American officials pointed to mounting neoconservative pressures for war.[12]

Arguably, then, the main impact of the NIE was not so much that it ruled out military action, but that it communicated this fact unmistakably to the rest of the world. The proverbial American "bad cop," waiting in the wings while European "good cops" pressed Iran to halt its uranium enrichment, was revealed to be a mirage. So too was the neoconservative "bad cop," waiting in the wings as Rice and other administration "good cops" pressed European governments to stiffen sanctions.

Whether the report will undermine the administration's efforts to secure a third round of UN sanctions remains to be seen, but if Iran continues to play its cards right the answer is almost certainly yes. Although Washington and its European allies appear intent on pushing for further sanctions, Russia and China will be far less willing. Indeed, shortly after the NIE findings were released, Russia said it would resume work on an Iranian nuclear facility.

The NIE comes amid a scrambling by pro-Western Arab states to engage Iran. On December 3, Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmedinejad addressed a summit of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) in Qatar. Weeks later, Ahmadinejad made his third visit to Saudi Arabia in the span of a year and became the first Iranian leader to make the hajj pilgrimage to Mecca since the 1979 revolution. Egypt, the only Arab state that does not have normal diplomatic relations with Tehran, sent its highest-level diplomatic delegation in nearly three decades. The idea of uniting Sunni Arab governments and Israel in an "axis of moderation" against Iran was already falling by the wayside (in part because the vast majority of Arabs either support or don't care about Iran's nuclear program),[13] but the NIE has accelerated its demise.

In short, the NIE has benefited Iran's foreign relations across the board, both by removing the stigma of an alleged covert nuclear weapons program and by visibly removing the threat of American military action (which European support for sanctions was intended it part to avert). However, if Iran did halt illicit weaponization programs, absence of evidence to the contrary would have continued to weaken the Bush administration's claims even if the NIE had not been released. In addition, the perceived threat of an American attack would have continued to wane in the Middle East and Europe as it became increasingly evident that preparations for an attack were not underway. In both cases, the NIE merely hastened the inevitable.

The most profound impact of the NIE could be on the internal situation in Iran. In light of strong Iranian public support for Ahmadinejad's nuclear policy, the looming specter of an American attack was enabling Iranian hardliners to deflect pressure for political and economic reform by trumpeting national security threats. Removing this threat could shift the political dynamics of the nuclear issue inside Iran. Without the shadow of war (and heightened nationalist fervor that comes with it), the arguments in favor of pressing on with uranium enrichment can be more easily challenged by those who don't wish to see Iran isolate itself from the world.

Although this argument has been dismissed by many neoconservatives, it bears mentioning that Ahmadinejad's political opponents almost invariably subscribe to it. If Iranian hardliners are determined to develop nuclear weapons irrespective of the repercussions, then perhaps the only way to avert this eventuality at a cost acceptable to American policymakers is promoting change within the system.

Notes

  [1] "U.S. Intelligence Review Contrasts With Administration Statements," The Washington Post, 2 August 2005.
  [2] Seymour Hersh, "The next act; Is a damaged Administration less likely to attack Iran, or more?" The New Yorker, 27 November 2006.
  [3] Iran: Nuclear Intentions and Capabilities, Key Judgments, National Intelligence Council, 3 December 2007.
  [4] When senior administration officials were briefed on the findings by intelligence officials in November, there was a "pretty vivid exchange", one participant told The New York Times. "U.S. Says Details in Military Notes Led to Iran Shift," The New York Times, 6 December 2006.
  [5] "There was a general belief that we all shared that it was important to put it out - that it was not likely to stay classified for long, anyway. Everything leaks," Cheney said in an interview with the online magazine Politco.com after the report was released. Cited in "Cheney: Iran report may hinder US policy," Agence France Presse, 5 December 2007.
  [6] The NIE is, in the words of David Frum, a "foundational political fact that will make it politically impossible for the Bush Administration to launch a strike at Iran's nuclear facilities." See David Frum, "No nukes, no war," The National Post (Toronto), 12 December 2007.
  [7] Zogby Poll: 52% Support U.S. Military Strike Against Iran, Zogby International, 29 October 2007.
  [8] Charles Krauthammer, "Axis Assessment," National Review Online, 21 December 2007. Former UN ambassador John Bolton called the report "politics masquerading as intelligence." Cited in Dan Diker, "Double jeopardy," The Jerusalem Post, 13 December 2007.
  [9] "NIE authors accused of partisan politics; Had opposed hard line on Iran," The Washington Times, 7 December 2007.
  [10] See, for example, Norman Podhoretz, "The Case for Bombing Iran," Commentary, June 2007.
  [11] Wurmser's remarks were first reported in September 2007 by Washington foreign-policy blogger Steven Clemons and subsequently corroborated by Newsweek. See "The Whispers Of War; A Secret Raid, Nuclear Ambitions and the Next Crisis," Newsweek, 1 October 2007. Wurmser denied making the remarks.
  [12] "Strategy on Iran Stirs New Debate at White House," The New York Times, 16 June 2007.
  [13] In an early 2007 survey of six Arab countries, less than one-fourth of respondents believed that Iran should be pressured to halt its nuclear program. See "U.S., Israel 'Biggest Threat' to Arabs, Poll Finds," Inter Press Service, February 8, 2007.