Abbas William Samii is the Iran analyst at Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, where he authors the weekly Iran Report. The author of numerous scholarly articles, contributions to edited collections, reviews, and newspaper articles, Samii's most recent piece is The Iranian Nuclear Issue and Informal Networks, Naval War College Review, v. 59, n. 1 (Winter 2006). Views expressed here are his own and do not necessarily reflect the position of RFE/RL.

Over the past quarter century, Syria and Iran have forged one of most enduring regional alignments in the Middle East. The "special relationship," as Syrian officials call it,[1] began evolving at a time when both countries were experiencing unprecedented isolation - not unlike their predicament today. As Damascus and Tehran confront an increasingly united international community, their relationship is growing stronger than ever.

Background

The Syrian-Iranian special relationship can be traced back to the late Imam Musa Sadr, the Iranian-born head of the Shiite Supreme Council in Lebanon, who became a "confidant, political ally, and friend" of then-Syrian President Hafez Assad in the early 1970s.[2] Although Assad was decidedly secular, his Alawite sect is an offshoot of Shiite Islam, and its experience in Syria before the 1963 Baathist coup was not unlike that of Lebanon's impoverished Shiites. In 1973, Sadr issued a fatwa declaring Alawites to be part of the Shiite Muslim community, helping Assad weather a political crisis over the Syrian constitution's requirement that the president be a Muslim and boost his legitimacy among a Sunni majority population accustomed to thinking of Alawites as heretics. In return, Sadr's Amal militia received decisive Syrian patronage during the civil war.

Sadr introduced Assad to prominent Iranian dissidents who would later occupy high-ranking positions in the Islamic Republic, such as Ebrahim Yazdi (foreign minister), Sadeq Ghotbzadeh (foreign minister), and Mustafa Chamran (defense minister).[3] Assad offered political asylum to Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini when he was expelled from Iraq in 1978 (he opted for Paris instead). When Khomeini returned to Tehran in triumph the following year, Assad effusively praised the revolution. Although often portrayed as quintessentially realpolitik, the strategic logic driving Syria's policy was rooted in its deep isolation in the Arab world, which had a clear sectarian dimension. The Assad regime was fighting a Sunni Islamist insurgency covertly aided by three Sunni regimes (Iraq, Jordan, and Egypt) who were openly denouncing Alawite political supremacy in Syria.

The seminal moment in the special relationship came in 1980, when Iraq invaded the newly established Islamic Republic of Iran. While other major Arab governments supported Baghdad, the Assad regime publicly denounced the invasion and exchanged high-level diplomatic visits with Tehran. As the war dragged on, the Syrians provided Iran with critical military hardware (particularly artillery and antiaircraft weapons) and allowed Iranian aircraft to refuel in Syrian territory before making return flights home. In April 1982, Syria closed its border with Iraq and shut down an Iraqi oil pipeline through its territory, in exchange for subsidized oil imports from Iran and trade concessions that gave Syrian companies a highly lucrative export market. The two important Shiite shrines of Zeinab and Ruqayyah (the sister and daughter of the third Shiite imam) in Syria drew tens of thousands of Iranian tourists every year, mostly war widows on trips financed by Iran's Martyrs Foundation.

The Syrian-Iranian alignment was strengthened by convergent interests in Lebanon after the 1982 Israeli invasion. Assad allowed Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) to deploy in areas of Lebanon's Beqaa Valley under Syrian control, where they played a direct role in the establishment of the Shiite fundamentalist Hezbollah movement.[4] Serving Syrian and Iranian interests alike, Hezbollah used suicide bombings to expel Western peacekeeping forces in 1984, then fought a successful 16-year campaign to expel Israeli forces from south Lebanon. Lebanon was also central to Syrian-Iranian sponsorship of Palestinian terrorist groups bent on collapsing the peace process. By the early 1990s, operatives of Hamas, Islamic Jihad, and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine - General Command (PFLP-GC) were being trained by Syrian and IRGC officers at camps in the Beqaa.

Although Syria's relationship with Iran was strategically critical, Syrian officials were careful not to call it an alliance. This was pragmatic, as it allowed the Baathist regime to position itself as an intermediary between Iran and the Arab Gulf states (before and after the war),[5] but it also reflected the fact that Assad viewed cooperation with Iran as a means to an end, not an end in itself. He made it very clear that he was willing to end Syrian sponsorship of terrorist groups in exchange for a complete Israeli withdrawal from the Golan Heights and American recognition of Syrian interests in Lebanon. Iran's proxies in Lebanon were not allowed to threaten his pursuit of this goal. When Hezbollah militants refused to obey Syria's ban on anti-Oslo Accord demonstrations in September 1993 (Assad was trying to win American favor), Lebanese soldiers gunned down five of them in the streets. Syria's involvement in the peace process remained a significant source of tension in his relations with Iran throughout the 1990s.

From Alignment to Alliance

Assad's death in 2000 and the ascension of his son, Bashar, led many outside observers to expect a thaw in Syrian-Israeli relations and a weakening of Syrian-Iranian ties. In fact, Bashar Assad quickly proved himself to be a more stalwart ally of Iran than his predecessor. The young dictator made no serious efforts to reach an accommodation with Israel (lacking the political strength to do so, perhaps) and dramatically upgraded Syrian sponsorship of Palestinian terrorist groups. Over the next five years, he met with Iranian President Mohammed Khatami no less than six times - a substantially higher rate of frequency than his father. Whereas his father never officially met Hezbollah Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah, Assad warmly received the firebrand cleric in Damascus many times. In 2004, Syria and Iran signed a "strategic cooperation" agreement, the details of which were not released to the public.

Tehran and Damascus have also strengthened economic ties in recent years. A new automobile manufacturing plant built in Syria by the Iran Khodro Industrial Group is set to begin mass production this year. In March 2006, the two countries agreed to built a pipeline to carry Iranian oil through Iraq to Syria's Mediterranean ports.

On the surface, Assad seemed to be working at cross-purposes with his ally in Iraq after the US-led invasion in 2003. The Syrian government (or powerful elements within it) allowed the infiltration of Sunni Islamist militants from around the Arab world bent on fighting the new Iraqi state, while Iran backed the leading Iraqi Shiite groups (the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq, al-Dawah al-Islamiya, and Muqtada al-Sadr's Mahdi Army) that dominate the state and its security apparatus. However, supporting rival sectarian factions that routinely engage in sectarian massacres is not quite as contradictory as it seems, as both efforts served to undermine U.S. democracy promotion in Iraq, and the ensuing violence works to discourage American intervention elsewhere in the region. Assad is not necessarily opposed to the Shiite-dominated authoritarian system that Iran's allies hope to build after an American pullout - indeed, he's providing the foil they need (Sunni insurgents) to mobilize the Shiite public in support of such a regime.

Syria's closer alignment with Iran was reinforced by its deteriorating relations with the West. Assad's meddling in Iraq and refusal to rein in militant Palestinian terrorist groups led the United States to join France in undermining Syrian control of Lebanon. In 2004, after Assad rebuffed American and French demands for the election of a new Lebanese president, the UN Security Council passed Resolution 1559, calling for the withdrawal of foreign forces from the country and the disarmament of all militias (an obvious reference to Hezbollah). Syria's regional and international isolation increased sharply with the February 2005 assassination in Beirut of former Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri and an ensuing UN investigation that uncovered circumstantial evidence of Syrian involvement. While Western governments closed all high-level diplomatic channels to Damascus and not one Arab leader was willing to publicly second Assad's claims of innocence, Iranian officials categorically dismissed the accusations and reaffirmed their solidarity with Syria.[6]

Although Syria withdrew its troops from Lebanon in April 2005, Iran and Syria have both encouraged Hezbollah to retain its arms, in defiance of Resolution 1559, leading one prominent Lebanese politician to describe his country as the weakest link in an alliance stretching "from Iran to Syria to Lebanon."[7] The impact of Syrian and Iranian influence was acknowledged in an April 18 UN report on the implementation of 1559, which called for "the necessary cooperation of all other relevant parties, including Syria and Iran."[8]

The unexpected victory of populist hard-liner Mahmoud Ahmadinejad in Iran's 2005 presidential election brought the two countries even closer together. In August, Assad became the first foreign head of state to visit the new president, who declared, "Common threats to Iran and Syria require joint cooperation from the two countries more than ever."[9] Ahmadinejad represents the ascendancy of a new generation in Iranian politics, men whose formative experience was participation in the Iran-Iraq War, making them deeply appreciative of Syria.[10] Many key figures in the new administration, like Ahmadinejad, served in the IRGC,[11] and some had very extensive experience working with the Syrians. Defense Minister Mustafa Mohammad Najjar reportedly served with the IRGC detachment in the Beqaa, while Ahmadinejad's new ambassador to Damascus, Mohammad Hassan Akhtari, served in the same position from 1989 to 1997.

As international pressure on Syria mounted, Ahmadinejad was engaged in his own standoff with the West over Iran's suspected nuclear weapons program. In August, Iran rejected a European offer of economic incentives in return for a permanent halt to its uranium enrichment program, leading the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to refer the matter to the Security Council. Rather than seeking to calm Western fears about Iran's intentions, Ahmadinejad enflamed them by publicly calling for Israel to be wiped off the map,[12] questioning the extent of the Holocaust,[13] and pledging to provide nuclear expertise to other Islamic countries.

Whether Ahmadinejad intended to cause this uproar, was appealing to his domestic constituency, or simply showed his inexperience has been the subject of much debate, but he appears to be driven by messianic religious zeal. The Iranian president is said to expect the imminent reappearance of the Mahdi, the 12th Shiite Imam who will return to earth bringing peace and justice.[14] A CD circulating in Tehran shows video footage of the president telling a leading cleric that a light surrounded him when he addressed the UN General Assembly last year, and that nobody in the audience blinked for almost half an hour.[15] However, Ahmadinejad is believed to have only marginal influence over a consensual foreign policy process, in which a number of top officials participate and over which Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei has the final say.

Ahmadinejad's January 2006 visit to Damascus left little doubt that Syria and Iran remain united more united than ever and committed to sponsoring rejectionist forces in the Middle East. The Iranian president met not only with Assad and Nasrallah, but also with the leaders of Hamas, Islamic Jihad, and the PFLP-GC.[16] At a joint press conference, the two presidents vowed to fight the plots of "world arrogance and Zionism" in Lebanon and called for "continued resistance" to Israeli "occupation of the holy Islamic lands."[17]

Syria has clearly drawn some strength from Iranian solidarity. Fearful that Syria's alignment with Tehran will create a powerful "Shiite crescent" in the region, the Saudis and Egyptians have been trying to mediate between Damascus and the West. However, so long as Assad is unwilling or unable to make the kind of compromises that would facilitate a rapprochement (e.g. full cooperation with the investigation into Hariri's death), he cannot really make use of this leverage. For better or for worse, he is committed to the "special relationship." With all signs pointing to a prolonged standoff between Tehran and the West over the nuclear issue, some analysts suggest that Syria, as the low-hanging fruit of the duo, will bear the brunt of Western retaliation.[18]

Notes

  [1] "We have a special relationship with Iran, not an alliance," Syrian Foreign Minister Walid Moallem said recently. Al-Jazeera, 20 April 2006.
  [2] Patrick Seale, Asad: The Struggle for Power in the Middle East (Berkley: University of California Press, 1988), p. 352.
  [3] Abbas William Samii, "The Shah's Lebanon Policy: The Role of SAVAK," Middle Eastern Studies, v. 33, n. 1 (January 1997), p. 78.
  [4] Amal Saad-Ghorayeb, Hizbu'llah: Politics and Religion, (London: Pluto Press, 2002), p. 14.
  [5] In the early-1990s, Syria brokered dialogue between Iran and the United Arab Emirates over the island of Abu Musa. In 1997, Damascus helped newly elected President Mohammed Khatami mend fences with the Arab Gulf states. Christin Marschall, Iran's Persian Gulf Policy: From Khomeini to Khatami, (London and New York: RoutledgeCurzon, 2003), pp. 94, 132, 138.
  [6] "Iran will share its experiences, those of sanctions in particular, with Syria, given the situation Damascus is facing at the present time," Iranian Vice President Mohammad-Reza Aref-Yazdi said as he welcomed Syrian Prime Minister Muhammad Naji al-Utri two days after Hariri's death. IRNA, 16 February 2005.
  [7] Druze legislator Walid Jumblatt, who heads the Progressive Socialist Party, cited in The Daily Star, 30 January 2006.
  [8] Third Semi-Annual Report of the Secretary-General to the Security Council on the Implementation of Security Council Resolution 1559 (2004), 18 April 2006.
  [9] IRNA, 7 August 2005.
  [10] Bill Samii, Iran: A New Generation And The Drift To The Right, 21 June 2005. Bill Samii, Iran: A New Paradigm and New Math, 26 June 2005. Charles Recknagel, Iran: New President Represents Second Generation Of Islamic Revolutionaries, 26 June 2005.
  [11] Bill Samii, Iran: President's Hard-Line Cabinet Choice Could Face Resistance, 15 August 2005.
  [12] Golnaz Esfandiari, Iran: President Says Israel Should Be 'Wiped Off Map', 27 October 2005.
  [13] Golnaz Esfandiari, Iran: President's Latest Comments About Israel Spark Further Condemnation, 9 December 2005,
  [14] Scott Petersen, "Waiting for the rapture in Iran," The Christian Science Monitor, 21 December 2005; ibid., "True believers dial messiah hotline in Iran," The Christian Science Monitor, 4 January 2006.
  [15] Golnaz Esfandiari, Iran: President Says Light Surrounded Him During UN Speech, 29 November 2005.
  [16] Al-Manar television, 20 January 2006.
  [17] IRNA, 19 January 2006.
  [18] "Because the U.S. hasn't the means, or the wherewithal, to engage Iran today militarily . . . it might prefer, paradoxically, to strike against Syria." Michael Young, Syria: The New Cambodia: Will Iran make the U.S. whack Assad?, Reason.com, 10 August 2005.